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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the relation between CEO inside debt and firm risk-
taking by exploiting the change in the tax treatment of UK pensions following two pension 
amendments. The 2006 pension reform introduces the annual and lifetime allowance for UK 
pension schemes, significantly increasing income taxes associated with CEO inside debt. The 
2011 allowance cut, which substantially reduces the annual allowance introduced in 2006, 
further increases income taxes on inside debt. We find that CEO inside debt, in the form of 
executive pensions declines after the 2006 reform while cash-in-lieu increases significantly. 
This effect is more severe after the 2011 allowance cut than the 2006 pension reform. UK 
firms appear to substitute away from pensions towards cash-in-lieu, where income taxes are 
less punishing. If the association between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, we 
should observe a change of risk-taking after the decline of inside debt. Our results, which 
exploit the exogenous nature of the reforms, show that the decline of CEO pensions does not 
lead to any change in firm risk-taking. This result suggests that no causal relationship exists 
between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. Our results extend the inside debt literature, 
where empirical evidence is mainly documented in the US. Contrary to findings in the US, 
our evidence suggests that the use of CEO inside debt is motivated to minimise income tax 
rather than a tool to moderate firm risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Inside debt, managerial holdings of a firm’s debt, accounts for a considerable amount of a 
CEO’s total compensation. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document that Fortune 500 CEOs 
have on average $900,000 inside debt in the form of annual executive pension and deferred 
compensation, representing 10% of CEO’s total pay between 1996 and 2002. Comparable to 
their US data, our sample of FTSE 100 CEOs have defined benefit pensions (hereafter DB) of 
£208,000 on average, accounting for 5% of their annual compensation between 2003 and 
2016. Due to its significance, there is a growing literature that examines inside debt’s effect 
on managerial behaviours. Edmans and Liu (2011) theorise that inside debt could be used as 
an efficient tool to reduce a firm’s risk, as it makes managers potential debtholders of the 
firm, aligning the interests of managers with those of a firm’s debtholders. The literature 
finds that managerial inside debt is positively related to various risk-averse policies (e.g., 
Cassell et al., 2012) and firm cash holdings (e.g., Liu et al., 2014), while being negatively 
related to loan yield (e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014) and dividend pay-out (e.g., Srivastav et 
al., 2014; Eisdorfer et al., 2015).i Table 1 summarises the main findings of inside debt on firm 
risk-taking in the literature. The empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports a negative 
association between inside debt and firm risk-taking. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In this study, we seek to re-examine the impact of inside debt on firm risk-taking. Our 
motivations are twofold. First, the evidence related to inside debt and various firm policies is 
mostly documented in the US. ii  Edmans and Liu (2011) are very cautious about their 
theoretical results. They argue that the impact of inside debt on risk-taking is only tested in 
the US; whether it applies in another country should be further examined.iii In a recent study, 
Li et al. (2018) call for extending researches of CEO inside debt from the US market to the 
global market.iv Using hand-collected UK pension data, our study extends the literature by 
examining inside debt in a new market. The differences in pension tax rules between the US 
and the UK lead to our new results.  
Second, our quasi-experimental design provides new evidence to assess the causal association 
between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. Similar to other studies in corporate finance, 
the endogeneity problem also plagues research on inside debt. To address this problem, the 
literature usually employs instrumental variables (e.g., Cassell et al., 2012; Liu, et al., 2014; 
van Bekkum, 2016). However, instrumental variables also suffer from validity and multi-
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endogenous regressors problems (e.g., Roberts & Whited, 2013; Gow et al., 2016). Another 
approach to mitigate endogeneity is a quasi-experiment, where a natural event is used to 
explore exogenous variations of independent variables. In this paper, we identify two UK 
pension reforms that directly affect CEO inside debt but have no apparent effect on firm risk-
taking policies. The natural experiment adds new evidence to the existing inside debt 
literature. Our empirical approach is inspired by Hayes et al. (2012), who use the adoption of 
FAS 123R in the US as the natural experiment. Stock option usage declines sharply after FAS 
123R is implemented, but FAS 123R adoption does not directly affect a firm’s operating 
policy. The 2006 pension reform in the UK is surprisingly similar to FAS 123R adoption in 
the US. CEO pension decreases significantly after the reform, but the reform does not affect a 
firm’s risk-taking policies. 
Our main findings are threefold. First, we provide new quantitative evidence on the rapid 
decline of DB pension. Similar to industry surveys (e.g., Lane Clark & Peacock LLP, 2015), 
our data show a downtrend of CEO DB pension. After the 2006 reform, UK CEOs are less 
likely to receive DB pension, while more likely to be paid with cash-in-lieu.v Our results also 
show the scale and timing effects of the tax reform, including the impact of a few gradual 
changes in the follow-up years. Specifically, the proportions of DB pension as a fraction of 
pension are 27.38%, 24.06%, 57.5% and 83.02% lower in the reform pending period 
(between August 2004 to March 2006), the reform introduction period (April 2006 to March 
2011), a big allowance cut period (April 2011 to March 2014) and a further allowance cut 
period (after April 2014) respectively, compared to that in 2003. On the other hand, cash-in-
lieu as the fraction of pension increased by 28.98%, 71.10%, 120.39% and 134.79% in 
corresponding periods. The effect was more pronounced in 2011 (when annual allowance is 
cut down further) than it was in 2006. The period has the largest decline in DB pension and 
the highest increase in cash-in-lieu. Besides, we find that CEOs with high DB pension prior 
to the 2006 reform show a larger reduction of DB pension after the reform. 
Second, our results are indicative that the sharp decline of DB is driven by the tax saving (of 
CEOs’ income taxes) rather than a simple cost reduction practice (to cut employers/firms’ 
pension expenses). DB pension is known to be in decline since the 1990s (Broadbent et al, 
2006), due to its high cost. Firms have been shifting DB to defined contribution (hereafter 
DC) pension to reduce pension expenses for almost two decades. However, the accelerated 
decline of DB in recent years was primarily driven by the 2006 tax reform. If the recent 
decline of DB is caused by firm cutting costs, we should also observe an increase in DC 
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pension. In contrast, our results show that DC pension stayed almost constant after the 2006 
pension reform and started to decline after the annual allowance was further cut in 2014. 
There is a clear shift from DB to cash-in-lieu, rather than from DB to DC. The reform makes 
both DB and DC pension tax inefficient, while cash-in-lieu becomes the optimal form of 
pension. The result confirms our tax benefit hypothesis that pension is a tool for tax 
optimisation. Firms alternate the form and level of CEOs’ pension once tax on pension 
changes. Our result is also in line with Murphy (2012) who argues “government intervention 
into executive compensation – largely ignored by researchers – has been both a response to 
and a major driver of time trends in CEO pay”. 
Our final finding is that the change of CEO DB pension after the reforms does not lead to any 
change of firm risk-taking. DB pension is a form of inside debt as its payoff depends on the 
survival of the firm. If the relationship between inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal, 
then a change of CEO DB pension after the reform should lead to a change in firm risk-taking. 
However, we do not find a corresponding change in firm risk-taking after the decline in DB 
pension. Previous studies suggest that executive compensation and corporate governance are 
important determinants of a firm’s risk policies (e.g., Dutordoir et al., 2014). Hence, we 
consider the market measure of risk-taking: firm total risk (stock return volatility) and three 
policies with risk implications: cash holdings, R&D and CAPEX.  
To ensure the robustness of our results, we first employ differenced cross-section regressions 
(Hayes et al., 2012) using the pension reforms as the exogenous shocks, which provides new 
evidence on the causal relationship of inside debt and risk-taking. Since our results differ 
from previous studies in the US, we test conventional designs that are widely used in the 
literature, firm and CEO fixed-effect models. To further address the endogeneity problem, we 
employ 2SLS with CEO age as the instrumental variable which is also widely used in the 
compensation literature. Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by zero value 
observations, as many CEOs do not have any inside debt, we employ two additional models. 
First, we run the fixed-effect models excluding observations that have zero inside debt 
(Cassell et al. 2012). Second, we re-run our previous regressions using a DB dummy instead 
of a continuous DB variable to ensure that our results are not biased by zero values (van 
Bekkum, 2016). Overall, our findings suggest that there is no causal relationship between 
CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. The risk reduction hypothesis of CEO inside debt does 
not hold in the UK. 
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Our results on inside debt are not consistent with those in the US. There are two possible 
explanations. First, the risk associated with CEO pension can be managed or circumvented. 
An underlying assumption of executive pension is that top managers can only access it when 
they reach their retirement ages. In such a circumstance, pensions generate risk-averse 
incentives for CEOs. However, UK top managers have several options to shield this risk. One 
of these options is the early withdrawal of pension. Typically, pension access age is 55 in the 
UK, but early withdrawal is possible depending on the rules of pension schemes. An 
unapproved pension scheme can also be structured to allow early withdrawal (Goh & Li, 
2015). For instance, Richard Solomons, CEO of InterContinental, withdrew his entire DB 
pension of £2,958,000 when he was 53 in 2014.vi While early pension withdrawal is not a 
common practice due to its punishing tax,vii it undermines the seniority assumption of a 
firm’s outside debt.viii Early withdrawal of an entire pension would make CEO inside debt 
more senior or completely secured. Another option is transferring CEO pension to a separate 
and more secure pension scheme. For example, Michael Geoghegan, director of HSBC, 
transferred his entire DB pension of £12,918,000 from his employer HSBC to an independent 
pension scheme in 2006.ix After the transfer, a CEO’s DB pension no longer depends on his 
or her firm’s survival, effectively shielding the CEO from a firm’s default risk. 
The second possible explanation is that pension is a tool for optimising CEOs’ income taxes, 
which has little to do with firm risk-taking. The fact that firms substitute away from pension 
towards cash-in-lieu suggests that firms are concerned with tax effects on CEO compensation, 
but are relatively unconcerned with risk incentives provided by DB pension. The widespread 
use of Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (hereafter SERP) in the US is mainly due to 
their favourable tax treatment. The Internal Revenue Service (hereafter IRS) explicitly 
supports the use of SERP to defer income tax on pension contribution, and there is no limit 
on the number of deferrals. On the other hand, the use of Employer-Financed-Retirement-
Benefit-Scheme (hereafter EFRBS), the equivalent of SERP in the UK, is rare (Goh & Li, 
2015). This is because Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC, the UK tax authority) 
imposes strict rules for EFRBS, deliberately preventing it from working as a tax evasion tool. 
We discuss tax rules differences between the US and the UK in Section 2. If CEOs employ 
pensions to minimise income tax, then the pension’s role in firm risk-taking is negligible. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First and most importantly, we 
address CEO inside debt from a new angle by looking at the income tax of pension. The 
previous literature tends to explain the use of CEO inside debt from the point view of 
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corporate tax (e.g., Gerakos, 2010; Anantharaman & Lee, 2014; Chi et al., 2017; Chaudhry et 
al., 2017). Studies have found that DB pension leads to corporate tax saving. In addition to 
corporate tax, we argue that income tax plays a vital role in determining CEO pension. 
Taking advantage of detailed disclosure in tax allowances and executive pension in the UK, 
we are able to identify individual CEOs’ tax treatment in their pension scheme for a given tax 
year. This paper highlights the importance of income tax in determining CEO compensation. 
Our second contribution is to use a natural experiment approach to provide new causality 
evidence of inside debt. By employing the differenced cross-sectional estimation around the 
2006 UK pension reform and the 2011 allowance cut (two exogenous events), our research 
method provides an alternative control to the endogeneity problem that affects many studies 
in corporate finance. This paper also enriches the executive remuneration literature by using 
regulation change as an exogenous shock to assess the causal relationship between 
managerial pay and firm policies. 
Our third contribution is providing new evidence of inside debt outside the US. Although DB 
pension is not unique in the US, most studies are US-based.x Our study of CEO inside debt 
in the UK is a direct response to the previous literature, such as Edmans and Liu (2011) and 
Li et al. (2018), which explicitly calls for extension of the US study to other countries. 
OECD (2019) shows that over the last decade (2008–2018), 17 out of 22 reporting countries 
witnessed a significant decline of DB pension. If the decline of DB pension is universal 
across the globe, what are the impacts on firm risk policy? Our findings provide an answer to 
the question. In short, our paper offers new implication for other countries, where DB 
pensions are also in sharp decline. 
2. Executive pension in the UK 
2.1 Tax treatment in the US and the UK 
We first discuss the tax treatment of executive pension in the US and the UK. In the US, 
firms can grant pensions to their CEOs in two ways: tax-qualified pension plan and non-
qualified pension plan. A qualified plan, usually taking the form of 401(k), is a DC pension 
plan that is available to every employee. Contribution to 401(k) plans is tax-free up to an 
annual limit, which is set at $19,500 in 2020. Contributions beyond this limit are possible but 
subject to income tax. Non-qualified plans, usually taking the form of SERP, are pension 
plans that are specifically designed to reward top managers. SERPs are very popular in the 
US because CEOs do not pay income tax on any contribution immediately as long as the 
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SERP is unfunded and unprotected. Tax deferral allows CEOs to accumulate pensions at a 
pre-tax return rate. Since SERPs are usually non-qualified, they provide firms with certain 
flexibility on how to structure them. Unfunded non-qualified plans are designed to be tax 
efficient and are publicly recognised by IRS.xi Since there is no limit on the amount of 
contribution, SERPs are usually used to top up executive pensions once CEOs exhaust their 
limits in 401(k). While CEOs still pay taxes when they start receiving retirement benefits, 
many options to reduce income tax are available. For example, CEOs can move to a state 
where there is a lower state income tax rate.  
Similar to CEOs in the US, a typical UK CEO receives pension from two sources: tax 
approved pension schemes and unapproved pension schemes. Tax approved schemes, usually 
take the form of occupational DC or DB pension schemes and function almost identically to 
401(k) plans in the US. CEOs can make tax-free contributions up to a specific limit into the 
scheme. In the 2020–2021 tax year, the annual tax-free limit for pension is £40,000. 
Unapproved schemes in the UK, on the other hand, are quite different from non-qualified 
plans in the US. Contributions to unapproved pension schemes do not attract any tax relief in 
the UK, and they are also subject to the annual contribution limit. Unlike SERP in the US, 
income taxes on pension contributions are not deferrable in the UK.xii HMRC specifically 
states that unapproved pension schemes are not tax evasion tools.xiii  
In short, the main difference in tax rules between the UK and the US is the income tax 
deferral. Since UK CEOs cannot defer income tax on pensions, it is expensive to award 
CEOs with pension directly. As our results will later show, firms are increasingly replacing 
executive pensions with cash-in-lieu. In contrast, SERPs are very popular in the US because 
of their tax efficiency. 
2.2 The 2006 UK pension reform 
In the UK, a series of tax rules were introduced in April 2006. The new rules intended to 
replace complicated tax regimes that govern different categories of pension schemes. The 
most notable feature of the reforms was the introduction of annual allowance (hereafter AA) 
and lifetime allowance (hereafter LTA), which limits the amount of pension 
income/contribution that is tax deductible. The AA limits tax relief when funds 
allocate/contribute to a registered pension scheme. It caps the amount of pension contribution 
that is tax-free for a given tax year. Any amount of pension contribution beyond AA is taxed 
as regular income. On the other hand, LTA limits tax relief when the employee (or pensioner) 
begins to receive a pension benefit. It caps the total pension amount that can be drawn from 
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registered pension schemes without triggering an extra tax charge. Any pension benefit 
received above this limit will be subject to additional tax. 
In the pre-2006 era, applying tax relief to pension contributions was very complex, involving 
adding up contributions under different tax regimes. The AA simplifies this process and puts 
a total limit on all contributions to all registered pension schemes. Since similar but more 
complicated tax relief was already in place before the 2006 reform, it is not clear how AA 
would affect top managers’ pay.xiv The AA was £ 215,000 when it was first introduced in 
2006 and was still very generous compared to the Earnings Cap in previous years. Table 2 
presents Earnings Cap, AA and LTA in the UK from 2003 to 2019. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Before the introduction of LTA, top managers paid income tax when they started receiving 
pension benefits, usually at the top income tax rate. xv  Since 2006, there has been an 
additional charge if their total pension benefits are paid over LTA. Excessive withdrawal of 
pension over LTA would trigger a tax charge of 25% if it is taken as an income, or 55% if it 
is taken as a cash lump sum. EFRBS can be set up to avoid both AA and LTA, but HMRC 
introduces new rules to address special vehicles that are deliberately set up to avoid taxes. 
EFRBS is also very costly to operate. Therefore, the use of EFRBS in the UK is not as 
widespread as SERP in the US (Goh & Li, 2015). 
In short, the 2006 UK pension reform has significantly increased income tax associated with 
pension. CEOs with a large amount of pension would incur extra tax when their pensions 
exceed either AA or LTA. 
2.3 AA reduction in 2011 
Since AA and LTA were introduced in 2006, AA and LTA have been reviewed annually in 
the government budget. These changes were small and gradual. However, in 2011, AA was 
slashed from £255,000 to £50,000. After this cut, the amount of allowance available for tax 
relief was dramatically reduced. While the change is small in terms of complexity, the 
amount of tax relief involved is substantial. After the reduction, AA is only one-fifth of its 
original amount in 2010. CEOs who do not exceed pension allowance in 2010 could face an 
income tax charge at 40% from 2011, even though their pension incomes have not changed at 
all. We also call the 2011 allowance cut a big reduction in AA and a big cut in allowance (or 
AA change) in later sections. 
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The 2006 pension reform and 2011 allowance cut are so influential that many stakeholders 
are affected. Its effect is still valid today. For example, survey data from Lane Clark & 
Peacock LLP. (2015) show that salary supplements in lieu of any pension provision continue 
to grow after the 2006 reform. In 2015, 38% of FTSE 100 executives used cash as an 
alternative to pensions. They call the phenomenon of shifting pensions to cash-in-lieu ‘the 
end of the road for executive pensions’. On the other hand, the reforms generated huge tax 
revenue for HMRC. According to Pension Policy Institute (2016), tax receipts on pensions 
reached £13 billion in 2015, a 60% increase from 2002 thanks to the introduction of tax 
allowances. The reform has also accelerated closure of DB pension schemes across the UK, 
as this could lower pension liability and improve firms’ financial standing. For example, 
Rauh (2006) documents that firms reduce capital expenditures in response to a reduction in 
internal resources caused by mandatory pension contributions. The reform also affects 
pension funds. Too rapid growth in pension assets (e.g., exceeding allowance) may result in 
disadvantaged tax treatment or the so-called ‘penalty for good performance’. Pension funds 
need to structure new tax-efficient investment plan for their members. Finally, the pension 
reform has ignited several ongoing debates. A key argument is that AA and LTA undermine 
pensions as a long-term saving vehicle. Steve Webb, the UK’s pension minister (2012-2015), 
had suggested that frequent LTA reductions have created uncertainty in long-term financial 
planning and have undermined people’s trust in long-term savings (Royal London, 2016). 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1 Tax benefit hypothesis  
CEOs may favour pensions over other forms of compensation for two reasons. First, pensions 
are similar to salary, which is independent of any firm performance measures. A higher level 
of pension inflates a CEO’s non-contingent pay. Goh and Li (2015) document that pension 
works as a substitute for performance-based compensation, especially bonuses. They suggest 
that CEOs take advantage of pensions to lower pay-performance sensitivity. Second, pension 
has tax advantages compared to other forms of compensation. Income tax on pensions is 
usually deferred, or even free if pension contributions are below specific tax allowances. 
Firms and CEOs have strong incentives to take advantage of pensions to maximise CEOs’ 
take-home pay and also minimise firms’ compensation expenses. However, the introduction 
of AA and LTA after the 2006 pension reform significantly increases the income tax that 
CEOs have to pay. In our sample, 81% of FTSE 100 CEOs with DB pension either exceed 
AA or LTA between 2003 and 2016. Depending on their overall income, the highest tax rate 
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could reach 55% after the reform. This significantly reduces the attractiveness of pension as a 
form of tax-efficient compensation.   
Tax is an important consideration when firms make decisions related to CEO compensation. 
A small but growing literature is investigating the impact of tax on CEO compensation. For 
example, Widdicks and Zhao (2014) show that option exercise behaviours are affected by 
different tax rules. They find different compensation practices in the UK and the US are 
driven by the different tax treatment of CEO stock options. Focusing on CEO inside debt in 
the US, Chaudhry et al. (2017) document that firms are using DB pension deficit to achieve 
corporate tax savings. Their study indicates that firms may manipulate pension value to 
obtain benefits from corporate tax.  
In our UK pension case, we argue that if top managers (firms) use pensions to evade income 
tax (reduce expenses), they should alternate the form and level of pension payment once tax 
rules change. Due to the complexity of pension tax, a direct comparison of income tax pre- 
and post- the 2006 reform is very difficult and could distract the focus of the paper. We 
provide a simple demonstration in Appendix C. Overall, income tax on pension increases 
significantly after 2006 as AA and LTA offer less tax relief than rules based on the pre-2006 
Earnings Cap.  
Firms are also willing to pay CEOs with cash-in-lieu instead of pension, as the same amount 
paid in cash provides CEOs with more net pay. In other words, minimising CEO income 
taxes also reduces expenses as firms could pay CEOs with a lowered gross amount. Yet 
CEOs still receive the same amount of after-tax pay. This leads to our tax benefit hypothesis. 
We expect a significant decline in both DB and DC pension, while a sharp increase of cash-
in-lieu as the substitute. Our specific hypothesis is listed as follows. 
H1: After the 2006 pension reform, CEOs receive fewer defined benefit (DB) pensions, fewer 
defined contribution (DC) pensions, and more cash-in-lieu of pensions.  
The AA and LTA are reviewed annually by the UK government. In 2011, AA decreased to 
£50,000 from its highest level of £255,000 in the previous year. In 2014, AA was slashed 
further to £40,000. Therefore, we expect that the change in 2011 is more severe than the 
introduction of AA and LTA in 2006. While the 2006 reform completely overhauls pension 
tax rules, tax reliefs from the new rules were still generous in some areas. For example, a 
CEO only pays an AA charge when his or her annual pension contribution is above £255,000, 
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which is a generous amount even in our sample of FTSE 100 CEOs who have a mean 
pension of £204,000. More than half of CEOs in our sample would not pay an AA charge 
before 2011 but would have to pay an AA charge of 40% on the same pension contribution 
afterwards. 
Another important aspect of the 2011 AA reduction is that the change was not expected. All 
pension allowances are reviewed and amended in the UK government budget every year. In 
the April 2009 budget, AA was set to be held constant at £255,000 until 2016. However, in 
the June 2010 budget, HM treasury took a complete U-turn on the pension tax and planned to 
reduce AA from £255,000 to £50,000.xvi This change was unexpected by the pension industry. 
Our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Compared to the 2006 pension reform, the annual allowance (AA) reduction in 2011 
leads to a larger reduction of defined benefit (DB) pensions and defined contribution (DC) 
pensions, while a larger increase for cash-in-lieu of pensions. 
3.2 Risk reduction hypothesis  
The US literature unambiguously documents that CEO inside debt encourages risk-averse 
behaviours. The theoretical argument is that inside debt, such as DB pensions, makes CEOs 
potential debtholders. In the event of bankruptcy, CEOs suffer considerable losses as they 
may not recover the full value of their DB pensions. As a junior debtholder of a firm’s asset, 
a CEO is not the first in the queue to claim a firm’s residual value. Both the US and the UK 
governments set up related schemes to guarantee pension payments to some extent. However, 
these guarantees offer limited protections to CEOs with a large amount of pension. In the US, 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) could fund pension deficit when 
employers go bankrupt, up to a maximum limit of $64,432 per beneficiary in 2017 if the 
employee is retired at the age of 65. In the UK, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) provides a 
similar guarantee against employer bankruptcy, capping at an annual payment of £41,461 
after April 2020. In our sample of FTSE 100 CEOs in 2003–2016, the average DB value is 
over £1.6 million. Therefore, a large proportion of UK CEOs’ DB pension remains exposed 
to firms’ default risk. 
As CEOs’ wealth is tied to firms’ future financial health, CEOs are likely to take less risks 
and adopt conservative policies. For example, He (2015) notes that a large amount of inside 
debt is associated with high-quality financial reporting. Eisdorfer et al. (2015) find that firms 
with more inside debts pay fewer dividends. Cassell et al. (2012) observe that inside debt is 
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associated with a number of risk-averse firm policies (e.g., low leverage and R&D). All these 
findings utilise accounting-based measures to capture firms’ risk-taking choices. They 
directly observe firms’ risk-averse policies. Inside debt is also negatively associated with 
market-based measures of firm risk. For example, Bennet et al. (2015) find that inside debt is 
negatively associated with bank default risk. Wei and Yemack (2011) document bond prices 
rise in firms with high CEO inside debt after SEC mandate inside debt disclosure. 
Anantharaman et al. (2014) find that inside debt leads to low loan yield. In more recent 
studies, the effect of inside debt on risk-taking is documented as conditional. Kabir et al. 
(2018) show that CEOs cut R&D spending if they have more DB pensions and shorter career 
horizons. Li, Lin, Sun and Tucker (2018) provide evidence that the relationship between 
inside debt and corporate conservatism is mostly for non-investment grade firms. 
Overall, the findings in the literature are consistent: inside debt is associated with a number of 
risk-averse firm policies as well as various market measures of firm risk. Table 1 provides a 
review of the literature on inside debt and risk-taking. These findings have profound policy 
implications as compensation reforms concentrate exclusively on equity and other incentive 
pay. CEO pension and its risk-averse effect are often overlooked. Sundaram and Yermack 
(2007) even argue that firms award CEO large equity to counteract conservative incentives of 
large pension.xvii These findings suggest another possibility for future compensation reforms. 
For example, the UK Remuneration Code and the EU bonus cap were introduced in the 
aftershock of the credit crisis. The aims of these two reforms are limiting bank CEO pay and 
bank risk-taking, but neither reform has any rule related to the executive pension which could 
be an effective tool to curb bank risk-taking. While studies in the US are abundant, evidence 
of inside debt in another country is scarce. Confirming evidence outside the US is important, 
as inside debt could offer a new instrument to policymakers in those countries. 
We closely follow the literature from the US to motivate risk reduction hypothesis for three 
reasons. First, pension regulations are quite similar and comparable in the UK and the US. As 
we have discussed in section 2.1, 401(k) plan in the US is almost identical to an approved DC 
pension scheme in the UK. SERPs in the US are also very similar to approved DB pension 
schemes in the UK, though their tax treatment is different. Second, the implicit role of DB on 
firm risk is comparable in the UK and the US. DB is not a secured benefit for CEOs and 
sponsors are liable to pay the deficit of DB pension in both countries. In the event of firm 
bankruptcy, capped protections for DB pension are provided by governments in both 
countries. Third, previous literature also employs the same risk implications for UK studies. 
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For instance, Kabir et al (2013, 2018) find that CEO DB pension provides risk-averse 
incentives in the UK, which is consistent with the US literature.  
Following the literature, we also expect a negative association between CEO inside debt and 
firm risk-taking. Our empirical test utilises the 2006 pension reform and 2011 allowance cut 
as natural experiments. If inside debt and firm risk policies are causally associated, then we 
should observe an immediate change of firm policies following the pension reform. That is a 
decline (increase) of DB pension would lead to a higher (lower) level of firm risk-taking. Our 
main risk reduction hypothesis is as follow: 
H3: If CEO defined benefit pensions (DB) and firm risk-taking are negatively associated, then 
the change of firm risk-taking should be negatively related to the change of CEO DB pension 
after the pension reform. 
We first consider two firm policies with risk implications: R&D and CAPEX. Both research 
and development (R&D) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are risky firm policies due to their 
uncertainty and timing of expected payoff. Cassell et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence 
that R&D and working capital are negatively associated with CEO inside debt in the US. 
Similar to their study, we expect a negative association between R&D, CAPEX and CEO DB 
pension in the UK. If the 2006 UK pension reform led to a decrease in DB pension, we 
should observe an increase of R&D and CAPEX after the reform.  
Apart from accounting-based measures of firm risk, we also examine market measures of 
firm risk-taking. Stock return volatility is a proxy of a firm’s total risk. A large return 
volatility implies a high level of risk. Based on the risk-averse argument, van Bekkum (2016) 
documents that a high level of CEO inside debt leads to a low level of risk for US banks. He 
considers stock return volatility along with other risk proxies, including value at risk (VaR) 
and expected shortfall (ES). Following Cassell et al. (2012) and van Bekkum (2016), we also 
expect a negative association between stocks return volatility and CEO DB pension in the UK.  
We also examine the association between cash holding and inside debt. Since firms hold cash 
for various reasons besides risk aversion, we need to look further at how inside debt could 
interact with firm cash holdings. The previous literature identifies several motivations for a 
firm to hold cash: (1) transaction needs (e.g., Miller & Orr, 1966); (2) precautionary needs 
(e.g., Han & Qiu, 2007); (3) tax-saving needs (e.g., Foley et al., 2007); and (4) agency self-
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interests (e.g., Harford et al., 2008). In addition to those theories, we argue that CEO DB 
pensions also provide incentives for firm cash holdings.  
First, DB pension is a risky and unsecured pay component that makes CEOs potential 
debtholders. There is a growing literature that examines the relationship between risk and 
cash holdings from debtholders’ points of view. For instance, Acharya et al. (2012) document 
that a firm is more likely to accumulate a higher level of cash reserve if it faces a higher level 
of default risk. Harford et al. (2014) find that a firm is more likely to increase cash holdings 
and save cash from operating cash flows if it has a higher level of refinancing risk. CEOs 
with DB pension are potential debtholders of their own firms. They are more likely to hold 
cash if they have a large amount of DB pensions, which is in line with the interests of 
debtholders who prefer cash for security. Consistent with this risk aversion argument, Liu et 
al. (2014) document that cash holdings are positively related to CEOs’ inside debt in the US. 
Second, cash is the most liquid asset to fund any DB pension deficit. Since the introduction 
of the Pension Act 1995, UK firms have a legal obligation to pay DB pension deficit within a 
pre-specified period. When a firm fails to meet its statutory funding objective, the UK 
pension regulator has the power to issue a contribution notice, financial support directions 
and restoration orders. In other words, firms with a significant pension liability are under 
pressure to raise sufficient cash to fund the DB pension deficit.  
Liu et al. (2014) argue that a high level of cash holdings indicates a conservative firm 
policy.xviii Cash holdings help to fund DB pension deficit, easing the concern of pension 
safety. We expect a high level of firm cash holdings for a large DB pension size. That is a 
decline (increase) of firm cash holdings when CEOs’ DB pensions are lowered (increased). If 
the UK pension reforms lead to a decrease in DB pensions, we should observe a drop in cash 
holdings after the reform. Our specific hypothesis is as follows: 
H4: If CEO defined benefit pensions (DB) and firm cash holdings are positively associated, 
then the change of firm cash holding should be positively related to the change of CEO DB 
pension after the pension reform. 
4. Research design 
4.1 Test tax benefit hypothesis 
According to the tax benefit hypothesis, we expect a significant decline in DB and DC 
pensions, coinciding with a sharp increase of cash-in-lieu after the 2006 UK pension reform. 
Although the reform became effective in 2006, AA and LTA are reviewed annually, so 
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gradual changes in tax allowances are still slowly introduced. For example, even though AA 
was reduced substantially in 2011, it was further reduced in 2014. For this reason, we expect 
pensions to continue declining long after 2006. Furthermore, discussions of the 2006 reform 
started in 2001 and were then amended several times during the consultation period until it 
was finalised in 2004. Therefore, we expect some changes of pension arrangements to occur 
before 2006. Table 3 presents a summary of the reform timeline below.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
To fully examine the impact of the reforms and investigate the effects of the gradual 
reduction of tax allowances, the sample period is divided into five subperiods to coincide four 
key milestones of the pension reform. The first milestone date is chosen to be August 2004, 
as the Finance Act 2004 was published when all details of the pension reform were finalised. 
This is the date when firms were fully aware of the reform’s implementation, and we expect 
them to start making anticipatory changes. The second milestone date is April 2006, which 
was when the reform became effective. Naturally, we choose this date to study the impact of 
reform before and after its effective date. The third milestone date is April 2011 when the big 
cut in AA became effective. As this is a big policy surprise, we expect a larger impact on 
pension arrangements. The last milestone date is April 2014, which is the date when AA was 
cut further. We expect DB pension to continue its gradual decline after the 2014 allowance 
cut. By testing these periods separately, we examine how CEO pensions change in response 
to each regulation change. The extended testing period also allows us to examine the 
evolution of CEO pensions. Employing different event windows to explore the impact of law 
and regulation change is common. Li et al. (2008) investigate the market reaction to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. They document that the market is sophisticated enough to 
interpret and respond to legislative events surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Our 
model is as follows: 
Pension structure i,t   = α0 + α1 Between Aug04 to Mar06 (law pending)  
                                            + α2 Between Apr06 to Mar11 (initial introduction) 
                                            +  α3 Between Apr11 and Mar14 (a big cut in allowance)  
                                            + α4 After Apr14 (a further cut in allowance) 
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                                            + α5 Σ CEO characteristics i, t   + α6 Σ Board characteristics i, t    
                                            + α7 Σ Firm characteristics i, t   + α8 Industry i + δi, t                        (1) 
We expect a big change in pension arrangement to happen between August 2004 and March 
2006 (coefficient α1). This is because the reform is already finalised, and the 2-year period 
was designed to give firms time to prepare for the upcoming reform. The impact is likely to 
be moderate between April 2006 and March 2011 (coefficient α2) as changes are already 
implemented for many firms in the prior period. Due to a big surprise in AA reduction, we 
expect to find a large impact between April 2011 and March 2014 (coefficient α3). The 
difference between these two coefficients (α2 and α3) is used to test H2, where we expect that 
changes in AA reduction is larger than changes in the initial reform. As far as the further cut 
in AA is concerned, we also expect a significant change after April 2014 (coefficient α4). As 
pension becomes even less tax efficient after further cut in AA in 2014.  
We employ a Tobit model in Equation (1). As a large proportion of UK CEOs does not have 
any DB pension, our pension structure variables contain a large number of zero value 
observations. Excluding these zero value observations would introduce selection bias as 
firms’ decisions to award inside debt are not random. In our sample, firms that award inside 
debts to their CEOs are usually large and less risky. If we treat inside debt as censored at zero, 
we have a significantly censored dependent variable in regressions. The use of a Tobit model 
for censored dependent variables is well documented in compensation studies. Domínguez-
Barrero and López-Laborda (2007) use a Tobit model to estimate the determinants of 
personal pension plans, while Bryan et al. (2000) employ a Tobit model to estimate the 
determinant of CEO stock-based compensation.  
For dependent variables, we consider pension structure in terms of DB, DC and cash-in-lieu. 
For independent variables, we use four dummy variables (α2–α5) to capture the five testing 
periods. To control other factors that may affect CEO pension type, we add CEO (age, tenure, 
nationality, gender and equity pay), board (CEO duality and board independence) and firm 
characteristics (size, market to book ratio, leverage, profitability and stock return volatility) 
in Equation (1). These control variables are widely used in the CEO pension literature (e.g., 
Cassell et al., 2012; Anantharaman et al., 2014). We also control for industry fixed-effect but 
not for year fixed-effect in Equation (1), as year fixed-effect overlap our main independent 
variables. The design to drop year fixed-effect is consistent with Goh and Li (2015), who 
investigate the impact of the financial crisis on the UK executive pension.  
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In addition, we conduct Wald tests to examine the difference between independent variables. 
We would like to see whether the coefficients of these four period dummies of regulation 
change are different. As stated in H2, we expect the 2011 cut in AA would lead to a bigger 
reduction in CEO pensions than the initial reform in 2006.  
4.2 Test risk reduction hypothesis 
We summarise the research designs of the literature on inside debt and risk-taking in Table 4. 
In these studies, OLS and firm fixed-effect models are widely used. Typically, dependent 
variables are proxies of risk-taking, and independent variables are proxies of DB pension. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The literature usually assumes the following relationships between firm risk, firm 
characteristics and DB pension: 
Riski,t=b0+b1Firm Characteristicsi,t+b2DB pensioni,t + ui + φi,t                                         (2)          
In Equation (2), Risk is a firm risk-taking proxy (e.g., cash holdings, R&D, CAPEX, and 
stock volatility). DB pension is a proxy for CEO inside debt. ui are some time-invariant 
characteristics that are unobservable by the researcher, which include CEO risk-aversion and 
outside wealth or a firm’s productivity function. Firm fixed-effect regressions are natural 
candidates to address the time-invariant omitted variable. Himmelberg et al. (1999) propose 
another approach to address the unobservable variable if we take a differenced version of 
Equation (2) as follows: 
∆Riski,t=c0+c1∆Firm Characteristicsi,t+c2∆DB pensioni,t + ∆φi,t                                         (3)         
By using differenced regression, ui is cancelled out from the Equation (2). If ∆DB pensionit 
and ∆Firm Characteristicsit are uncorrelated, the equation is well specified to identify the 
causal association between inside debt and firm risk-taking. However, firm characteristics 
and CEO DB pension could be jointly determined. Any endogenous change in inside debt is 
likely to come from (or affect) changes of firm characteristics. Therefore, the following 
relationship between DB pensions and firm characteristics should also hold: 
DB pensioni,t=e0+e1Firm Characteristicsi,t+ωi,t                                                                    (4)     
Since both DB pension and firm risk-taking are determined by firm characteristics, a simple 
OLS regression on Equation (2) would lead to a biased and inconsistent coefficient, b2. 
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Regression on Equation (3) is also problematic as variation in ∆DB pension comes primarily 
from variation in ∆Firm Characteristics, as shown in Equation (4). The regression could lack 
the power to reject the null, as ∆Firm Characteristics are already included as control variables 
in Equation (3). The standard solution offered from the literature is using instrumental 
variables which isolate variation of DB pension that are uncorrelated with firm characteristics 
(e.g., Anantharaman et al., 2014). While these studies use instrumental variables to mitigate 
the endogeneity problem, it does not completely remove the bias.xix   
To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we use a framework similar to Hayes et al. (2012), who 
examine the effects of stock options on firm risk-taking. They use the implementation of FAS 
123R in the US, where the regulation change increases the accounting cost of awarding stock 
options to CEOs, as an exogenous shock. In their study, the widespread decline of stock 
options award after the implementation of FAS 123R serves as a natural experiment.  
In our setup, the pension reforms explicitly affect DB pensions but have little or no direct 
impact on a firm’s operating policies. Hence, the reforms serve as exogenous events for our 
experimental design. We perform cross-sectional regressions on differenced variables in pre- 
and post-reform periods to account for the exogenous shock. Considering the following 
cross-sectional differenced regression: 
∆Riski=a0+a1∆Firm Characteristicsi+a2∆DB pensioni+∆εi                                                    (5)              
This regression is based on time differenced variables.xx This is different from Equation (4), 
where all variables are first differenced. The time difference in Equation (5) is taken around 
the pension reforms, e.g., an average is calculated using observations before the reform, and 
another average is calculated using observations after the reform. The difference between 
these two average values is the new change variable. This regression provides evidence of the 
causal association between firm risk-taking and CEO DB pension. This is because, first, the 
time difference removes the time-invariant omitted variable, ui, as shown in Equation (2). 
Second, the time difference is taken before and after the pension reform, as changes in DB 
pension are largely driven by the new regulation, and these changes are exogenous to any 
firm characteristics. We should observe a statistically significant coefficient a2 in Equation (5), 
if the association between inside debt and firm risk-taking is causal. 
5. Data and sample description 
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Our sample consists of non-financial and non-utility firms in the FTSE 100 index. We 
exclude financial and utility firms, as strict regulation in these two industries limits their 
comparability with firms in other industries. We also restrict our sample to CEOs who have 
tenure over one year as the previous CEO’s decisions can carry over to the newly appointed 
CEO. Our sample is from 2003 to 2016, covering both pre- and post-reform periods. Our 
final sample consists of 1,155 firm-year observations from 126 firms and 254 CEOs. Our data 
are comparable to Li and Young (2016) who investigate compensation practices of FTSE 350 
firms. 
We hand collect all UK CEO pension data from company annual reports. Compared to other 
pay components, the estimation of DB pension value is less straightforward. Following Kabir 
et al. (2013, 2018), we use hand-collected data from annual reports to estimate the CEO DB 
pension value. An example of the estimation based on the company’s annual report is 
provided in Appendix B. CEO non-pension compensation and corporate governance data are 
collected from BoardEx. All other firm-level data come from Bloomberg. 
The sample descriptive statistics are listed in Table 5. The proportions of CEOs with DB, DC 
and cash-in-lieu are 34%, 31% and 42% respectively. Cash-in-lieu is the most popular 
pension type in our sample. On average, the proportions of CEO annual pension are 58%, 14% 
and 28% for DB, DC and cash-in-lieu respectively. DB pension is by far the most generous 
pension type. On average, CEOs hold a £1.6 million DB pension in terms of transferable 
value. CEO DB pension value is 18% of his or her equity incentives value (DB to equity 
ratio=0.18).xxi Our sample shows that CEOs are 54 years old with 6-year tenure on average. 
40% of CEOs are non-British (Foreign CEO=0.40), and only 4% of CEOs are female. The 
vast majority of CEOs do not hold the position as chairperson (CEO duality=0.03). 
Independent directors also outnumber executive directors (Board independence=68.17). 
For risk-taking proxies, our sample demonstrates that firms have 8.52% of their total assets in 
the form of cash on average. They spend 1.75% and 7.82% on R&D and CAPEX as a 
percentage of total sales respectively. The mean stock return volatility is 33.72%, and 90% of 
our observations pay a cash dividend. In short, these characteristics are consistent with the 
profile of FTSE 100 firms. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 6 shows the correlations between our main variables. At the 1% significance level, 
CEO DB pension variables are negatively related to the variable of After April11. This fits 
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our tax benefit hypothesis that CEO DB pension declines after the regulation change, 
especially after the 2011 AA cut. CEO total DB pension (DB total) is negatively related to 
firm cash holdings, CAPEX and stock return volatility. These correlations are consistent with 
the risk reduction hypothesis for CAPEX and stock return volatility, while this is not the case 
for cash holding and R&D spending. In addition, CEOs tend to have more DB pensions if 
they are British and their firms have a higher market to book ratio. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
6. Main Results  
6.1 The impact of pension reform on CEO pension structure 
Table 7 demonstrates the impact of pension reform when other factors are controlled. The 
dependent variables are three pension structure variables: DB/Total pension in column (1), 
DC/Total pension in column (2) and Cash-in-lieu/Total pension in column (3). Our interested 
variables are those four period dummies (law pending, initial introduction, a big cut in 
allowance and a further cut in allowance).  
First, the DB pension shows a significant decline throughout the sample period. The 
coefficients of law pending, initial introduction, a big cut in allowance and a further cut in 
allowance are -27.38, -24.06, -57.50 and -83.02 respectively (column 1 in Table 7). They are 
all statistically significant at 5% level. It suggests that DB pension as a percentage of annual 
pensions declined by 27.38%, 24.06%, 57.50% and 83.02% in these four periods. 
Considering that the mean proportion of DB pension in our sample is 58%, a decline of 83.02% 
suggests that DB pension constitutes only 9.84% (58% × [1-83.02%]) of annual pension after 
April 2014.  
Second, cash-in-lieu increased dramatically throughout the sample period. The coefficients of 
law pending, initial introduction, a big cut in allowance and a further cut in allowance are 
28.98, 71.10, 120.39, 134.79 individually (column 3 in Table 7). They are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. It shows that cash-in-lieu as a percentage of annual pensions 
increased by 28.98%, 71.10%, 120.39% and 134.79% in these four periods. Considering that 
the mean proportion of cash-in-lieu in our data is 28%, an increase of 134.79% indicates that 
cash-in-lieu constitutes 65.74% (28% × [1+134.79%]) of annual pension after April 2014. 
Third, DC pension only shows a moderate decline after a further cut in AA in 2014. The 
coefficient of further cut in allowance is -27.63 and significant at 10% level (column 2 in 
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Table 7). Other period variables are not statistically significant. Considering that the mean 
proportion of DC pension in our sample is 14%, a decrease of 27.63% suggests that DC 
pension constitutes only 10.13% (14% × [1-27.63%]) of annual pension after April 2014.  
These results confirm a big shift from DB pension to cash-in-lieu. As we discussed 
previously, only DB and DC pension are subject to AA and LTA charge. CEOs are likely to 
be taxed twice for holding DB and DC pension. That is the tax on annual contribution if it 
exceeds AA, and tax on access to pension benefit if it exceeds LTA. Unlike DB and DC, 
cash-in-lieu is just a normal salary with a different name, and it is taxed once as a regular 
income. In short, the pension is less tax efficient than cash-in-lieu after the 2006 pension 
reform. We present a more detailed discussion about pensions’ tax treatments in Appendix C.  
These results are not only statistically significant but also economically important. After the 
pension reform, CEO pension structure is completely changed in the UK. Hundreds of 
millions of pounds are paid in cash rather than contribution in the pension scheme for top 
managers in the UK’s largest companies. The result clearly supports our first hypothesis (H1), 
a decline of pension and an increase of cash-in-lieu after the reform. Our results are also 
consistent with Morris et al. (2015). They show a decrease in DB pension following the 2006 
UK pension reform. 
Our second hypothesis (H2) argues that the big cut in AA allowance in 2011 has a bigger 
impact on pension. We employ Wald tests at the bottom of Table 7 to examine the 
differences between different periods. The coefficient of a big cut in allowance is -57.50, 
while that for the initial introduction is -24.06 (column 1 in Table 7). The difference between 
these two coefficients is -33.44 (-57.5 + 24.06), which indicates that the percentage in DB 
pension/total pension declines 33.44% more in the period of a big cut in allowance compared 
to the period of initial introduction (coefficient restriction 2 in column 1 at the bottom of 
Table 7). A similar result is also observed for cash-in-lieu (column 3 in Table 7) where the 
coefficient difference between a big cut in allowance and initial introduction is 49.28 (120.39 
– 71.10), and such a difference is statistically significant (coefficient restriction 2 in column 3 
at the bottom of Table 7). In other words, cash-in-lieu has a bigger increase in the period of a 
big cut in allowance compared to the period of the initial introduction. These results strongly 
support our H2 which states that the 2011 AA cut would lead to a larger reduction of DB 
pension and a bigger increase of cash-in-lieu than the 2006 pension reform.  
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As far as controlled variables are concerned, our results show that UK CEOs would have 
more DB pensions if their firms are larger and more geared, which is consistent with US 
studies (e.g., Sundaram & Yermack, 2007). Older CEOs in the UK would have more 
pensions, which is also in line with the US literature (e.g., Cen, 2010; Sundaram & Yermack, 
2007). However, CEOs in the UK have fewer DB pensions if their firms have a higher 
proportion of independent directors, which opposes findings in the US (e.g., Cen, 2010). It 
may highlight the monitoring role of independent directors in the UK. In addition, CEO 
nationality is a significant explanatory factor for DB pension. The proportion of DB pension 
in annual pension is 32.99% lower if a CEO is non-British. This finding is never documented 
in studies conducted in the US. A possible explanation is that foreign CEO is relatively rare 
in the US compared to the UK. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In short, the results in Table 7 support our tax benefit hypotheses (H1-H2). That is, the 
regulation changes increase income tax and significantly decrease the usage of DB pension, 
while they encourage the adoption of cash-in-lieu. Compared to DB pension, we do not 
observe the same level of decline in DC pension. UK firms appear to substitute away from 
DB pension towards cash-in-lieu, where income taxes are less punishing.  
We offer an alternative explanation to our results in Table 7 here. DB pension may decline 
for reasons that are completely independent of the tax reform. Firms’ total pension liabilities 
could be huge. Changing firm-wide pension policies could make a significant difference in a 
firm’s balance sheet. DB pensions are more expensive than DC pensions as employers have 
to bear the risk of longevity. Therefore, it makes financial sense to shift pension from DB to 
DC. Pension Policy Institute (2003) documents such a shift in the early 2000s. It argues that 
the growing DB pension cost is due to increased longevity and low investment return. Firms 
may close DB pension plans and shift CEO pensions to alternative deferred compensation 
arrangements, simply because DB pension is too costly to maintain. Once a DB pension 
scheme is closed, it may stop future contribution to the scheme. However, sponsors are still 
liable for pension benefits accumulated before the winding-up period.  
If the change of pension structure was mainly driven by cost saving, we should expect a shift 
from DB pension to DC pension because DC pension is cheaper to maintain than DB pension. 
However, we document a shift of DB pension to cash-in-lieu, rather than a shift of DB 
pension to DC pension. If the change of pension structure was purely driven by tax treatment, 
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we should expect a decline of DB and DC pension at the same time because the tax treatment 
is the same for both DB and DC pension. However, we find that DC pension only started to 
decline after April 2014 when AA was further cut. The main reason is that firms take 
advantage of AA to exhaust allowance for DC pension. To illustrate this with an example: Ian 
Cheshire, CEO of Kingfisher, received DC pension of £203,000, £205,000, £208,000, 
£49,400 and £70,000 in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively. These annual DCs are 
all in line with AA for their respective years. It suggests that Kingfisher employed DC 
pension to exhaust its CEO’s AA for each financial year. Firms appear to award DC pension 
to exhaust their CEOs’ AA, and then use cash-in-lieu to top up further benefit. In short, both 
tax and cost saving factors influence CEOs’ pension choices. Cash-in-lieu is the most tax 
efficient and cheapest to maintain. We witness its strong growth throughout the sample 
period. On the other hand, DB pension is not tax efficient. It is also the costliest type of 
pension to maintain. It is not a surprise that we find DB pension declines dramatically. DC 
pension is cheaper than DB pension to maintain, but it is less tax efficient compared to cash-
in-lieu. Therefore, we only demonstrate a moderate decrease in DC pension in the later stages. 
All in all, the tax treatment is a key determinant of CEO pension structure in the UK.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Next, we examine the impact of ex-ante pension value on the change of pension structure. 
We argue that CEOs with more pensions should be more affected by tax change. Therefore, 
they should have a stronger incentive to reduce their pension after the reform. To investigate 
this, we divide the sample into two groups based on whether CEOs exceed pension 
allowances or not. We define high pension group as CEOs who exceed either AA or LTA 
before the 2006 reform. As discussed in the introduction, our sample contains a large number 
of zero value observations, because many CEOs do not have any inside debt. We run Tobit 
regressions with interactive terms in Table 8. The table shows that CEOs with a high level of 
DB pension receive fewer DB pensions after the reform. For instance, the coefficient of After 
April06 × High DB_AA is -50.77 in column (3). Such a coefficient suggests that if a CEO 
exceeds AA before the 2006 reform, his or her DB pension as a fraction of total pension 
declines by 50.77% after the reform. A similar result is also documented when the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of DB pension in columns (1) and (2). 
Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that CEOs with a large amount of DB pensions reduce 
their DB pensions substantially more after the reform. Table 8 also shows that the magnitude 
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of DB pension reduction depends on ex-ante pension value, the amount of DB pension prior 
to pension reform. Since the amount of DB pensions affects the amount of income taxes that 
CEOs are liable to pay, these results further strengthen our argument that income tax is the 
key driver for the sharp decline of DB pension.  
6.2 The impact of CEO pension on firm risk-taking 
The previous literature finds that inside debt is negatively associated with a number of firm 
risk-taking measures, as summarised in Table 1. If the relationship between inside debt and 
risk-taking is causal, then we should observe an increase in risky policies as firms shift away 
from inside debt compensation in response to the pension reforms. In Tables 9–12, we 
present a formal analysis of the association between changes in firm risk-taking and changes 
in DB pension that corresponds to our research design. As described in Section 4.2, our 
research design allows us to exploit the cross-sectional relation between changes in firm risk-
taking and changes in DB pension while controlling omitted factors that might have affected 
firm risk policies in the same period. Our test procedure is as follows. For each firm, we 
calculate averages of variables in both pre- and post- reform periods. We then calculate the 
difference between those two average values for each variable. The newly formed differenced 
variables are then used in the regressions of Equation 5. Since there are two major changes to 
the pension taxes, the 2006 pension reform that introduces AA and LTA and the 2011 AA cut 
that significantly lowers AA, we present results for both regulation changes. Following the 
previous literature, we calculate three measures of inside debt. The first inside debt variable is 
the natural logarithm of total DB pension in pounds sterling (Caliskan & Doukas, 2015). It 
captures the absolute incentive from CEO DB pension. The second one is the ratio of DB 
pension to equity incentives (Sundaram & Yermack, 2007; Cassell, et al., 2012). It captures 
the relative incentives of inside debt compared to equity pay. The last inside debt variable is 
the relative ratio of DB pension to equity incentives based on firms’ debt-to-equity ratio 
(Kabir, et al., 2013, 2018; Liu, et al., 2014). It captures the trade-off between a CEO’s 
personal leverage and his or her firm leverage. 
[Insert Table 9,10,11,12 here] 
In Table 9, we regress changes in firm cash holdings on changes in DB pension, while 
controlling for firm size, market to book ratio, firm leverage and operating cash flow. Our 
sample size is quite small as a firm can only be included if it has observations both before and 
after the reform. Our full sample contains 126 unique firms, but only 95 firms have 
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observations both before and after the 2006 pension reform (97 for the 2011 AA change). We 
also control for CEO changes during the reform period. DB pension may change due to CEO 
turnover, rather than changes in a firm’s compensation policy. xxii  Thus, six regressions 
excluding firms that have CEO changes during the reform period are listed in columns 7–12. 
For the 2006 pension reform, most coefficients of inside debt variables are insignificant 
except the DB to equity relative (column 9) when CEO changes are excluded. Our results are 
inconsistent with hypothesis H4 and previous findings documented in the US. Turning to the 
2011 AA change (columns 4–6 and 10–12), none of the inside debt variables is significant. 
Table 10 examines the relationship between change in R&D and change in inside debt. The 
results are similar to those in Table 9. Coefficients of inside debt variables are all statistically 
insignificant. Overall, the results do not support our hypothesis H3. Table 11 examines the 
relationship between change in CAPEX and change in inside debt. All inside debt 
coefficients are negative, which is in line with the previous literature. However, none of the 
coefficients of inside debt is statistically significant. Table 12 presents the results for the 
relationship between changes in stock volatility and changes in inside debt. Similar to the 
results in Tables 9 and 10, coefficients of inside debt variables are not significant except DB 
to equity ratio (column 8). However, the sign of the coefficient is positive and contradicting 
to our H3. Therefore, we do not find evidence that firm risk-taking and inside debt are 
negatively associated.  
In summary, our results in Tables 9-12 do not support risk reduction hypothesis (H3-H4). The 
change of the CEO DB pension after the reform does not lead to a change of firm risk-taking. 
Our results hold for both the 2006 reform and the 2011 AA cut. These results are consistent 
for different proxies of CEO DB pension and firm risk-taking. There is no relationship 
between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking. 
7. Robustness Check  
Our results in Section 6 differ from the previous literature documented in the US. To ensure 
that our results are robust, we present additional tests in this section. 
7.1 Panel data regression 
Following the mainstream research design employed in the literature (summarized in Table 4), 
we employ fixed-effect models to directly investigate the relationship between firm cash 
holdings and CEO DB pension. We separate analysis of cash holdings from the rest of the 
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risk proxies. As discussed previously, cash is the most liquid asset to fund any pension deficit. 
Ideally, CEOs should be cautious about cash policy if they have a large amount of pension 
tied to the firm. Table 13 presents the regression results of inside debt on cash holdings. Our 
dependent variable is cash/total assets. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
As shown in Table 13 Panel A, none of the coefficients on inside debt variables is statistically 
significant. There is no association between firm cash holdings and inside debt. In Panel B, 
we divide our sample into two groups based on whether firms have pension deficit or surplus. 
The expectation is that firms with pension deficit should be more conservative about their 
cash policies. Therefore, CEO inside debt in these firms should encourage more cash 
holdings. However, we do not see any of these effects in Panel B. All coefficients of inside 
debt are statistically insignificant. These results do not support the causal relationship 
between cash holdings and inside debt.  
Table 14 reports the relationship between inside debt and other risk proxies, where dependent 
variables are R&D in Panel A, CAPEX in Panel B and stock return volatility in Panel C. To 
save space, we do not report control variables results. Panel D summarizes all regression 
results in Tables 13 and 14. As shown, most coefficients of inside debt variables are 
statistically insignificant. When they are significant, the sign of the coefficients is opposite to 
the risk reduction hypothesis, except for R&D in the CEO fixed-effect model. Overall, Table 
14 reinforces our results in Tables 9–12. There is simply no relationship between inside debt 
and firm risk-taking.    
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 
7.2 2SLS regression 
To address endogeneity concerns, we employ the differenced regression of Equation (5). 
These results are already reported in Tables 9–12. There are also other approaches to mitigate 
the endogeneity problem, as discussed in Section 4.2. Instrumental variables can be applied to 
Equation (2). Following Cassell et al. (2012) and van Bekkum (2016), we use CEO age as the 
instrumental variable and re-run regressions in Equation (2). CEO DB pension mechanically 
increases with CEO age (tenure) which has no direct interaction with firm policy. The 
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correlation matrix in Table 5 also confirms that CEO’s age is positively related to two DB 
pension variables at the 1% significance level. 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
The first-stage and the second-stage results are presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 15, 
respectively. In panel A, all three CEO DB pension variables are positively related to the 
instrument, log of CEO age, as expected. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirms that all 
three DB pension variables are endogenous. In panel B (the second-stage regression), we use 
the fitted value of DB pension from Panel A (the first-stage regression) as an independent 
variable. CEO DB total is not significantly related to firm cash holding, volatility, R&D and 
CAPEX (columns 1, 4, 7 and 10). DB to equity ratio and DB to equity ratio relative are 
negatively associated with volatility (columns 5 and 6) and R&D (columns 8 and 9). These 
results are consistent with the risk reduction hypothesis. However, these results do not pass 
the weak instrument test, so our interpretation is limited here. In short, we could not confirm 
that inside debt leads to risk-averse policies when we use the 2SLS estimation. 
7.3 Skewed distribution for DB pension data 
In our UK sample, 66% of CEOs have no DB pension at all. Furthermore, DB pension is 
highly skewed to the right where a small number of CEOs have a large amount of DB 
pensions. In the US, Cassell et al. (2012) also find a large number of firms with zero inside 
debt. Our results could be driven by a large proportion of zero value DB pension. We employ 
Tobit models in Tables 7 and 8 to mitigate such a problem (Domínguez-Barrero & López-
Laborda, 2007; Bryan et al. 2000).  
To further address the skewed distribution of DB pensions, we employ two additional 
approaches. First, we use subsample analysis. Following Cassell et al. (2012), we remove all 
observations with zero value DB pension. Our sample size falls to 392 from 1,155. Both firm 
and CEO fixed-effect models are employed in Table 16. Firm cash holdings, R&D, CAPEX 
and stock return volatility are examined in Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. In panel E, we 
summarize all regression results. Among all twenty-four regressions, we only find one 
regression result that is consistent with the risk reduction hypothesis. CAPEX is negatively 
related to DB to equity ratio relative, when a firm fixed-effect model is employed (column 3 
of Panel C). For other regressions, the coefficients are either insignificant or opposite to the 
risk reduction hypothesis. We do not find convincing evidence to support the risk reduction 
hypothesis when we exclude all observations with zero value DB pension. 
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[Insert Table 16 here] 
Our second approach employs DB dummy variable as suggested by van Bekkum (2016). In 
his sample of US banks, approximately 20% of CEOs and 40% CFOs do not have any inside 
debt. This raises the concern of sample selection bias. He argues that the value of a DB 
pension a CEO could have may be discretionary, as CEOs can choose the amount of pension 
contribution every year. A CEO could influence his or her DB pension contribution, based on 
his or her perception of a firm’s default risk. However, a CEO’s decision to own DB pension 
is less discretionary. Therefore, exploring the effect of whether CEOs have DB pension or not 
is more appropriate than examining the values of DB pension. In addition, testing the 
existence of DB pension rather than the value of DB pension would help to mitigate the 
impact of skewed distribution. van Bekkum (2016) creates a dummy variable 
(CEO_with_inside debt 0/1) for all samples, which equals one if a CEO has any inside debt 
and zero otherwise.xxiii Following van Bekkum (2016), we employ the same variable of DB 
dummy in Table 17. The coefficients of DB dummy are not statistically significant for cash 
holdings and stock return volatility in all regressions. It suggests that there is no relationship 
between cash policy, total risk and existence of DB pension. The coefficients for CAPEX and 
R&D are positively related to DB dummy, but this is contrary to our risk reduction 
hypothesis (H3). Similar to our previous results, we do not find evidence to support that CEO 
DB pensions lead to more risk-averse policies. 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
8. Conclusion & Discussion   
This paper provides the UK evidence on the relationship between CEO inside debt (in the 
form of DB pension) and firm risk-taking. Prior studies conducted in the US find that inside 
debt always leads to risk reduction policies, such as a high level of firm cash holding, a low 
level of stock return volatility and R&D spending. We examine the relationship between 
CEO DB pension and firm risk-taking by using two UK pension changes as exogenous 
shocks. The 2006 pension reform substantially increases the tax cost of pension, and the 2011 
allowance cut further increases income tax associated with pension. Neither of these 
regulation changes has any direct effect on firm policies. 
We employ differenced cross-section regressions, focusing on the change of firm risk-taking 
after the pension reforms and the change of CEO DB pension in the same period. If the causal 
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relationship between CEO inside debt and firm risk-taking is true, we should observe a 
change of firm risk-taking corresponding to a change of CEO DB pension after the reforms. 
We find that CEO DB pension decreases dramatically after both reforms. This is consistent 
with our tax benefit hypothesis. However, the decline of DB pension does not lead to a 
corresponding increase in DC pension. Instead, cash-in-lieu increases substantially. Firms 
appear to substitute DB pension with cash-in-lieu. CEOs use pensions to minimise income 
tax, and they alternate their pensions when tax on pensions changes. However, a change in 
CEO DB pensions does not lead to any change of firm risk-taking. This is inconsistent with 
the risk reduction hypothesis. We do not find that inside debt induces risk-averse managerial 
behaviours.  
Our results differ from related studies conducted in the US. There are two possible 
explanations. First, risk associated with CEO pension can be managed or circumvented by 
top managers in the UK. CEOs have a number of tools available to influence the payoff of 
their pensions, which can shield them from firms’ default risk. These options include early 
withdrawal of pension and transferring pension out of firms. CEO inside debt may be more 
protected and secured than expected by the literature. Second, CEO DB pension is used 
mainly to maximise tax benefit. We show that CEOs with a high DB pension value would 
reduce their pensions more after the reform. The pension arrangement may be structured to 
avoid income tax, rather than moderating a firm’s risk policies. 
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Appendix A.  Variables Definitions 
Panel A: Compensation variables 
 
Variable Name Definition 
DB pension Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has 
defined benefit pension, otherwise zero.  
DC pension Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has 
defined contribution pension, otherwise zero. 
Cash in lieu Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO has cash 
in lieu pension, otherwise zero.  
DB pension annual   The difference between a CEO defined benefit pension’s total 
transfer value in year t and that in year t-1, less a CEO’s 
personal contribution. 
DC pension annual   CEO annual defined contribution pension grant by the firm. 
Cash in lieu annual  CEO annual cash in lieu pension grant by the firm. 
Pension annual  The sum of DB pension annual, DC pension annual and cash in 
lieu annual.  
Annual compensation  The sum of CEO salary, bonus, pension, stock options and 
LTIPs grants during a particular year. 
DB pension total  CEO defined benefit pension’s total transfer value.  
DB to equity ratio  CEO defined benefit pension’s total transfer value scaled by the 
sum of a CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value.  
DB to equity ratio relative DB to equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio. 
CEO equity  The sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs value. 
 
Panel B: Regulation change variables 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Between Aug04 to Mar06 
(law pending) 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is 
between August 2004 and March 2006, otherwise zero. 
Between Apr06 to Mar11 
(initial introduction) 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is 
between April 2006 and March 2011, otherwise zero. 
Between Apr11 to Mar14 
 (a big cut in allowance) 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is 
between April 2011 and March 2014, otherwise zero. 
After Apr14  
(a further cut in allowance) 
Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is 
after 6th April 2014, otherwise zero. 
After Apr06 Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the observation is 
after 6th April 2006, otherwise zero. 
 
Panel C: CEO and board characteristics variables 
 
Variable Name Definition 
CEO age Natural logarithm of CEO age in years. 
CEO tenure  Natural logarithm of CEO’s years in the job.  
Foreign CEO Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO is non-
British, otherwise zero. 
Female CEO  Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO is female, 
otherwise zero. 
CEO duality  Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a CEO also holds 
the position of Chairman or Chairwoman, otherwise zero. 
Board independence  The number of non-executive directors scaled by the total 
number of directors.  
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Appendix A. (continued) 
Panel D: Firm characteristics variable 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Cash holdings  A firm’s cash holdings scaled by its total assets. 
Firm size  Natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets.  
Market to book ratio  A firm’s market value of equity scaled by its book value of 
equity. 
Leverage A firm’s total debt scaled by its total assets. 
Operating cash flows A firm’s cash flows from operating activities scaled by its total 
assets. 
Stock return volatility  The standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock return during a 
particular fiscal year.  
R&D expenses A firm’s research and development expenses scaled by its total 
sale. 
CAPEX expenses A firm’s capital expenditure scaled by its total sale. 
Dividend payer  Dummy variable which takes a value of one if a firm pays cash 
dividend, otherwise zero. 
ROA A firm’s EBTDA scaled by its total assets. 
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Appendix B. An example of pension valuation 
Following Kabir et al. (2013, 2018), we use hand-collected data from annual reports to estimate CEO 
DB, DC and cash- in- lieu. The example is from Kingfisher Plc 2013 annual report, where Sir Ian 
Cheshire is CEO. 
Part A: DB pension  
 
DB increment (2013) = Transfer value of DB (2013) - Transfer value of DB (2012) - Personal contribution 
 = £72,000 
Part B: DC pension & cash-in-lieu  
 
DC (2013) = Employer contributions to defined contribution scheme = £7,400 
Cash-in-lieu (2013) = Cash alternative = £230,700 
Part C: Pension variable construction in empirical analysis  
(1) Total pension = DB incremental + DC incremental + cash-in-lieu = 72,000+7,400+230,700= £310,100 
(2) DB/total pension= 72,000/310,100 = 23%   
(3) DC/ total pension = 7,400/ 310,100 = 2% 
(4) Cash-in-lieu/total pension = 230,700/310,100 =74% 
(5) DB total = LN (596,000) = 13.30 
(6) DB to equity = Transfer value of  DB to the estimated value of equity holding = 596,000/ 15,684,211 
=3.8%  
(7) DB to equity relative = DB to equity ratio scaled by the firm’s debt to equity ratio = 3.8% / 4.55%  
= 0.84 
Part D: Interpretation of pension variables in panel C 
In 2013, Kingfisher PLC CEO Sir Ian Cheshire had an annual pension of £310,100, including 23% of DB 
pension, 2% DC pension and 74% of cash-in-lieu.  His 2013 annual pension package was dominated by cash-in-
lieu. His DB pension value is only 3.8% of his equity holding (DB to equity = 3.8%). His personal leverage (DB 
to equity) is smaller than Kingfisher’s leverage (firm debt to equity) at 0.84 (DB to equity relative=0.84). 
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Appendix C. A simple demonstration of 2006 pension reform 
Directly comparing pension tax before and after the pension reform is very difficult. This is because tax rules 
are very complex and have multiple layers of special treatments and exceptions. The example we show below is 
a crude simplification, but the overall representation is still the same: the 2006 pension reform substantially 
increases income tax on pension. This is especially true for CEOs who are not restricted by the pre-2006 
Earnings Cap rules but are later captured by the AA and LTA rules. 
The table below reports a simple example relate to the 2006 pension reform. All figures are based on a 
hypothetical CEO whose pension benefits already exceed Earnings Cap, AA and LTA in 2006. The £100,000 
pay in pension or cash is on top of the CEO’s other compensation, hence “incremental”. In other words, the 
CEO is subject to both AA and LTA charge on the pension payment. This is a simplifying assumption as LTA 
charge is deducted at source by the pension administrator and only becomes payable when the benefits received 
exceed LTA. But the overall message remains the same; LTA is very expensive for a CEO with a large pension. 
Income tax rates are based on tax year 2006/07. To make comparison easy to follow, we also assume capital 
growth is 0%. 
Pre-2006 DB and DC pension   Post-2006 DB and DC pension   Cash-in-lieu of pension 
Incremental pension 
pay  
£100,000 
 
Incremental pension 
pay 
£100,000 
 
Incremental cash 
pay 
£100,000 
Income tax on 
pension contribution 
(tax exempt) * 
£0 
 
Annual allowance 
charge at the highest 
income tax rate 
(40%) 
£40,000 
 
Income tax at 
highest income 
tax rate (40%) 
£40,000 
Pension contributed 
after tax 
£100,000 
 
Pension contributed 
after tax 
£60,000 
  
 
Income tax on 
pension benefits 
(40%) ** 
£40,000 
 
Lifetime allowance 
charge at 25% 
-£15,000 
  
 
  
 
Pension after lifetime 
allowance charge 
£45,000 
   
   
Income tax on 
pension benefits at 
highest tax rate 
(40%) 
-£18,000 
   Incremental pay after 
tax 
£60,000 
 
Incremental pay after 
tax*** 
£27,000 
 
Incremental pay 
after tax 
£60,000 
*Based on 1989 occupational pension scheme, employer contributions are tax exempt. 
**Earnings Cap can be avoided if the CEOs pension benefits come from different pension regimes. 
***This LTA example is based on technical instruction titled “Pension Tax Manual” produced by HMRC. 
The instruction is available online at https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/pensions-tax-
manual/ptm080000 
First, a CEO in the pre-2006 era would pay far less income tax on pension. For £100,000 gross pay, a CEO 
would be tripled taxed (AA charge, LTA charge and also income tax) and pay 73% in total tax in the post-2006 
era. On the other hand, the same amount of £100,000 gross pay would be only taxed once and pay 40% in total 
tax in the pre-2006 era. This is because Earnings Cap rules are laxer in tax reliefs. CEOs have a range of 
flexibility to manoeuvre incomes to avoid Earnings Cap.  
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Appendix C. (continued) 
Second, cash-in-lieu of pension is more tax efficient than DB and DC pension in the post-2006 era. The tax 
treatment for DB and DC pension is the same in the post-2006 era, so we do not distinguish DB and DC in the 
above table. As soon as the CEO’ pension exceeds either AA or LTA, an additional tax bill will be triggered. 
Cash-in-lieu of pension, on the other hand, is just normal cash salary with a different name. So it would be taxed 
as regular income. Based on the 40% income tax rate, £100,000 incremental pay in cash-in-lieu would generate 
£60,000 take-home pay. Therefore, paying cash-in-lieu is far better than paying DB or DC pension in terms of 
tax treatment in the post-2006 era.  
Third, DB and DC pension are more tax efficient than cash-in-lieu in the pre-2006 era while in both cases, a 
CEO would receive £60,000 net of tax for £100,000 incremetal pay. It is still better to be paid in DB or DC 
pension as income tax on pension does not arise until a CEO starts receiving benefits. When the capital growth 
rate is not zero (we assume 0% for simplification), a CEO would receive even more after-tax pay than the same 
amount paid in cash-in-lieu. This may explain why the use of cash-in-lieu is so rare before the 2006 pension 
reform. 
Finally, Unfunded Retirement Benefit Schemes (UFRBS) and later Employer Financed Retirement Benefit 
Scheme (EFRBS) could be used to avoid AA and LTA. However, rules regarding those schemes are very 
complex. It is also very expensive to run those schemes due to heavy management expenses. Many of those 
schemes have to use offshore operation in a different tax jurisdiction to achieve tax efficiency.  
In summary, the most tax efficient way in the post-2006 era is awarding CEOs with DB or DC pension up to the 
AA and LTA limit. Then CEOs could be paid in cash-in-lieu to top up further benefits. That is why we expect a 
big increase in the use of cash-in-lieu, while the decline of DB and DC pension after pension reforms.  
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Table 1: Main results of the literature on inside debt and firm risk-taking  
Paper Sample 
country 
Main results 
Sundaram and Yemack 
(2007) 
US Inside debt is positively associated with distance to default. 
Wei and Yemack (2011) US 
Firms with more inside debts experienced bond prices rise 
after SEC disclosure reform. 
Edmans and Liu (2011) N/A 
Inside debt reduces firm risk and optimal inside debt should 
depend on CEO relative leverage.  
Cassell, Huang, Sanchez and 
Stuart (2012) 
US 
Inside debt is associated with a variety of firm risk-averse 
policies. 
Anantharaman Fang and 
Gong (2014) 
US 
Inside debt leads to a lower promised loan yield. Inside debt 
only reduces firm risk if it is a junior debt.  
Kabir, Li and Veld-
Merkoulova (2013)  
UK 
Inside debt, in the form of DB pension, is negatively 
associated with bond yield spread. 
Liu, Mauer and Zhang 
(2014) 
US Inside debt is positively associated with firm cash holdings. 
Srivastav, Armitage and 
Hagendorff (2014) 
US Inside debt is negatively associated with bank pay-out policy. 
Choy, Lin and Officer 
(2014) 
US Freezing DB leads to a higher level of total risk.  
Phan (2014) US 
Inside debt is positively associated with abnormal bond return 
in the event of M&A announcement. 
He (2015) US 
Inside debt is positively associated with financial reporting 
quality. 
Eisdorfer, Giaccotto and 
White (2015) 
US 
Inside debt is negatively associated with firm dividend pay-
out. 
Caliskan and Doukas (2015) US Inside debt induces CEOs to pay more dividends. 
Bennett, Guntay and Unal 
(2015) 
US Inside debt is negatively associated with bank default risk. 
van Bekkum (2016) US 
Inside debt is negatively associated with various measures of 
bank risk. 
Dang and Phan (2016) US Inside debt is positively related to short-maturity debt.  
Li, Rhee and Shen (2018) US 
Inside debt is negatively related to the level of outstanding 
convertible debt and probability of issuing convertible debt. 
Belkhir, Boubaker and 
Chebbi  (2018) 
US 
The value of excess cash to shareholders declines as CEO 
inside debt increases. 
Kabir, Li and Veld-
Merkoulova  (2018) 
UK 
R&D spending decreases for retiring CEO with more inside 
debts. 
Cambrea, Colonnello, 
Curatola, and Fantini (2019) 
US CEO inside debt investing plan is depending on firm safety. 
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Table 2: Earnings cap, annual allowance and lifetime allowance in the UK 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Paper Sample 
country 
Main results 
Deng, He, Kang and Zhang 
(2019) 
China 
Inside debt leads to a lower level of risk-taking in banking 
industry. 
Sheikh (2019) US 
Inside debt is negatively associated with measures of future 
risk. 
Borah, James and Park 
(2020) 
US Inside debt leads to a lower cost of debt and default risk. 
This table reports information for the pre-2006 pension allowance – Earnings Cap and the post-2006 pension 
allowances – annual and lifetime allowances in the UK. Earnings Cap determines annual contributions that 
can be made into a pension scheme without incurring any tax. It also determines the maximum amount a 
pensioner can receive from his/her pension scheme. Earnings Cap is replaced by Annual Allowance and 
Lifetime Allowance after April 2006.   
Tax year 
Earnings Cap 
 (Pre-2006) 
Annual Allowance  
(post-2006) 
Lifetime Allowance  
(post-2006) 
2002/03 £97,200 - - 
2003/04 £99,000 - - 
2004/05 £102,000 - - 
2005/06 £105,600 - - 
2006/07 £108,600 £215,000 £1.50m 
2007/08 £112,800 £225,000 £1.60m 
2008/09 £117,600 £235,000 £1.65m 
2009/10 £123,600 £245,000 £1.75m 
2010/11 £123,600 £255,000 £1.80m 
2011/12 £129,600 £50,000 £1.80m 
2012/13 £137,400 £50,000 £1.50m 
2013/14 £141,000 £50,000 £1.50m 
2014/15 £145,800 £40,000 £1.25m 
2015/16 £149,400 £40,000 £1.25m 
2016/17 £150,600 £40,000 £1.00m 
2017/18 £154,200 £40,000 £1.00m 
2018/19 £160,800 £40,000 £1.03m 
2019/20 £166,200 £40,000 £1.06m 
Source: HM Revenue & Customs pension tax manual: https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/pensions-
tax-manual 
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Table 3: Timeline of the UK pension reform 
Date Event 
01/03/2001 Pension tax review was initiated. 
01/07/2002 Lifetime Allowance was proposed. Preliminary effective date was set for April 2004. 
01/06/2003 Discussion paper was published. Reform effective date was delayed to April 2005. 
01/03/2004 The Finance Act 2004 was published. Reform effective date was finalized to be 6th April 
2006. 
06/04/2006 Annual Allowance and Lifetime Allowance became effective. 
01/04/2009 Budget 2009: Annual Allowance would remain at the same level until 2015-2016. 
01/06/2010 Budget 2010: Annual Allowance was proposed to be reduced to £30,000 - £45,000. 
14/10/2010 The UK government confirmed Annual Allowance would be reduced to £50,000, 
effective from 6th April 2011. 
06/04/2011 Annual Allowance was reduced to £50,000 from £255,000. 
06/04/2014 Annual Allowance was further reduced to £40,000 from £50,000. 
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Table 4: Research design of the literature on inside debt and firm risk-taking  
 
Paper Sample Cross-
section 
Period No. of 
observation 
Proxies for risk-taking Proxies for inside debt Model  Employed 
Sundaram 
and Yemack 
(2007) 
Fortune 500 237 
firms 
1996–
2002 
1,570 Distance to default  (1)CEO’s pension value/ CEO’s stock and option 
value 
Fixed-effect models with a separate 
intercept assigned to each unique 
CEO-company pair (2) CEO’s pension/equity > firm’s debt/equity 
Cassell et al., 
(2012) 
S&P 1500 1,265 
firms 
2006–
2008 
1,059–2,994 (1)Log of total risk (1)Log of CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio OLS with industry and year fixed-
effect  (2)Log of idiosyncratic risk  (2)CEO to firm debt/equity ratio >1 
(3)R&D/sales (3)Log of CEO relative incentive ratio  
(4)Diversification (4)Log of CEO relative incentive ratio CA 
(5)Working capital  
(6)Total book leverage   
Kabir et al., 
(2013) 
FTSE 350 47  2003–
2012 
287 Bond yield  (1)Pension incremental / annual pay OLS with industry and year fixed- 
effect 
firms (2)Pension to equity ratio 
  (3)CEO Relative leverage 
Liu et al., 
(2014) 
US firms 
Available in 
ExecuComp 
N/A 2006–
2011 
6,009 Cash holding / net assets  (1)CEO’s pension value/ CEO’s pension, stock 
and option value 
OLS and firm fixed-effect 
(2) CEO to firm debt/ equity ratio 
Srivastav et 
al., (2014) 
Largest US 
banks 
N/A 2007–
2011 
403 Change of dividend payout  Log of CEO relative incentive ratio Binary choice model  
Eisdorfer et 
al., (2015) 
700 largest 
US firms  
272 
firms 
2000–
2009 
1,611 (1)Dividend yield (1)CEO’s pension value/ CEO’s pension, stock 
and option value 
Pooled OLS with year fixed-effect 
(2)Dividend payout ratio  
(3)Dividend net of 
repurchase  
(2)CEO Pension/ Total assets  
Caliskan and 
Doukas 
(2015) 
S&P N/A 2006–
2011 
2,117 Dividend payer or not  (1)Dollar value for inside debt Logistic model  
(2)Log of CEO leverage over firm leverage 
(3)CEO leverage > Firm leverage 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Paper Sample Cross-
section 
Period No. of 
observation 
Proxies for risk-taking Proxies for inside debt Model  Employed 
Bennett, 
Guntay and 
Unal (2015) 
371 US bank 371 
firms 
2006–
2008 
371 (1) Distance to default (1) Log of inside debt OLS, WLS and Probit 
(2) Equity volatility (2) Log of CEO inside debt/CEO equity 
(3) Expected default 
frequency 
(2) Inside debt/total compensation 
(4) CAMELS Rating (3) Log CEO relative leverage 
van Bekkum 
(2016) 
US Banks N/A 2007–
2009 
319 (1)Total volatility Log of CEO leverage relative to firm leverage  OLS  
(2)Idiosyncratic volatility 
(3)Systematic volatility 
(4)Value at Risk (VaR) 
(5) Expected shortfall (ES) 
(6)Financial distress 
Dang and 
Phan (2016) 
S&P N/A 2006–
2012 
4,793 Short term debt  CEO leverage  OLS and firm fixed-effect  
Li, Rhee and 
Shen (2018) 
S&P 898 2006–
2011 
3,558 (1)Proportion of convertible 
debt to total debt 
outstanding  
CEO-to-firm relative debt-to-equity ratio Tobit and Probit  
(2)Probability of issuing 
convertible debt 
(3)Probability of 
convertible debt conversion  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,155 observations from 126 UK FTSE 100 non-financial 
and non-utility firms during 2003–2016. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variables Mean Q1 Med Q3 Std. 
DB Pension (dummy) 0.34 0 0 1 0.47 
DC Pension (dummy) 0.31 0 0 1 0.46 
Cash in lieu (dummy) 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 
DB pension annual  (£000s’) 208 0 0 68 602 
DC pension annual  (£000s’) 51 0 0 32 114 
Cash in lieu annual  (£000s’) 101 0 0 175 237 
DB/Total pension (%) 58 0 0 18 40 
DC/Total pension (%) 14 0 0 8 42 
Cash in lieu/ Total pension (%) 28 0 0 46 45 
Pension annual (£000s) 360 51 204 378 539 
Annual compensation  (£000s’) 4,403 1,921 3,176 4,958 5,068 
DB pension total (£000s) 1,605 0 0 1,330 3,346 
DB to equity ratio (times) 0.18 0 0 0.12 0.41 
DB to equity ratio relative (times) 0.64 0 0 0.28 1.93 
CEO equity (£000s) 58,127 4,705 10,634 23,062 264,599 
CEO age (years) 53.95 49.98 54.25 57.89 6.06 
CEO tenure (years) 6.29 2.70 4.60 7.80 5.87 
Foreign CEO (dummy) 0.40 0 0 1 0.49 
Female CEO (dummy) 0.04 0 0 0 0.19 
CEO duality (dummy)   0.03 0 0 0 0.18 
Board independence (%) 68.17 60.00 70.00 77.78 11.69 
Cash holdings (%) 8.52 3.23 5.99 11.10 7.74 
Firm size ( £ M)) 18,386 3,592 7,671 22,331 50,475 
Market to book ratio (times) 4.15 1.57 2.76 4.84 6.91 
Leverage (%) 24.95 15.07 23.88 33.98 14.56 
Pension deficit (£ M) -418 -292 -60 0 1,178 
Operating cash flows (%) 10.88 6.75 10.00 14.05 6.15 
Stock return volatility (%) 33.72 22.46 29.20 40.18 16.01 
R&D expenses (%) 1.75 0 0 0.91 4.57 
CAPEX expense (%) 7.82 2.13 4.07 8.36 10.18 
Dividend payer (dummy) 0.90 1 1 1 0.30 
ROA (%) 6.83 3.48 6.50 10.10 7.55 
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Table 6: Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the sample of 1,155 observations from 126 UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms during 2003–2016. Typeface is 
bold if it is significant at least at 1% level. 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(1) DB total 1                   
                    
(2) DB to equity ratio 0.68 1                  
                    
(3) DB to equity ratio relative 0.52 0.75 1                 
                    
(4) CEO equity  -0.03 -0.12 -0.09 1                
                    
(5) CEO tenure 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.26 1               
                    
(6) CEO age 0.07 0.11 0.10 -0.02 0.32 1              
                    
(7) Foreign CEO -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 0.07 -0.13 0.03 1             
                    
(8) Female CEO -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.10 1            
                    
(9) Between Apr06 and Apr11 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 1           
                    
(10) After Apr11 -0.15 -0.18 -0.14 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.12 0.06 -0.64 1          
                    
(11) Cash holdings  -0.15 -0.10 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 0.13 0.14 0.06 -0.06 1         
                    
(12) R&D expenses -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.15 1        
                    
(13) CAPEX expense  -0.21 -0.13 -0.09 0.05 0.11 -0.03 0.22 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.10 1       
                    
(14) Stock return volatility -0.15 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.25 -0.15 0.12 -0.03 0.21 1      
                    
(15) Firm size 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.21 -0.05 0.19 0.22 0.03 -0.05 0.18 -0.22 -0.05 0.13 -0.12 1     
                    
(16) Market to book ratio 0.09 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.07 -0.18 -0.10 1    
                    
(17) Leverage 0.15 0.10 -0.14 -0.03 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.22  -0.20 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.16 1   
                    
(18)  ROA 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.09 -0.08 0.11 0.05 -0.06 -0.32 -0.12 0.29 -0.13 1  
                    
(19) Dividend payer 0.09 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.23 -0.05 -0.08 -0.42 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.26 1 
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Table 7: The impact of pension reform on CEO pension structure 
This table reports results from Tobit regressions describing the impact of UK pension reforms on CEO pension 
structure. The sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from 2003–2016. The total 
number of observation is 1,155 from 126 unique firms. The dependent variables are DB/Total pension, 
DC/Total pension and Cash in lieu /Total pension in column (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The independent 
variables are four dummy variables represent four periods of reform: Between Aug04 to Mar06 (law pending), 
Between Apr06 to Mar11 (initial introduction), Between Aprl11 to Mar14 (a big cut in allowance) and After 
Apr14 (a further cut in allowance). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Z statistics are reported in bracket. All other variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Variables (1) 
DB/  
Total pension 
(%) 
(2) 
DC/  
Total pension 
(%) 
(3) 
Cash in lieu/  
Total pension 
(%) 
Between Aug04 to Mar06 (law pending) -27.38** 10.83 28.98** 
 (-2.03) (0.68) (2.03) 
Between Apr06 to Mar11 (initial introduction) -24.06*** 6.03 71.10*** 
 (-2.04) (0.43) (5.69) 
Between Apr11 to Mar14 (a big cut in allowance) -57.50*** -24.58 120.39*** 
 (-4.30) (-1.59) (9.03) 
After Apr14 (a further cut in allowance) -83.02*** -27.63* 134.79*** 
 (-5.74) (-1.72) (9.82) 
CEO age -17.46 127.70*** 80.26*** 
 (-0.50) (3.37) (2.77) 
CEO tenure -1.73 4.50 -17.35*** 
 (-0.33) (0.82) (-4.13) 
Foreign CEO -32.99*** 27.10*** -17.12*** 
 (-4.16) (3.24) (-2.76) 
Female CEO -18.55 58.09*** 3.16 
 (-0.99) (3.20) (0.22) 
CEO equity -2.94 0.15 1.08 
 (-1.40) (0.07) (0.65) 
CEO duality 30.47 -33.47 -42.16** 
 (1.64) (-1.56) (-2.16) 
Board independence -1.68*** 1.29*** -0.82*** 
 (-4.42) (3.27) (-2.70) 
Firm Size 19.06*** -10.70*** -8.76*** 
 (5.91) (-3.23) (-3.44) 
Market to book ratio 0.83* 0.90* -0.37*** 
 (1.73) (1.67) (-2.94) 
Leverage 0.85*** -0.18 0.24 
 (3.34) (-0.65) (1.21) 
ROA -0.41 0.33 -1.19 
 (-0.75) (0.60) (1.30) 
Stock return volatility -0.11*** 0.02 0.06 
 (-4.13) (0.08) (0.29) 
Constant -6.97 -490.36*** -223.54** 
 (-0.05) (-3.23) (-1.94) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Left censored 798 794 668 
Uncensored 357 361 487 
Coefficients restriction 1 Coe. (Law pending) =Coe. (Initial introduction) 
Difference in coefficients (restriction 1) -3.33 4.80 -42.12*** 
Coefficients restriction 2 Coe. (Initial introduction) = Coe. (a big cut) 
Difference in coefficients (restriction 2) 33.44*** 30.61*** -49.28*** 
Coefficients restriction 3 Coe. (a big cut) = Coe. (a further cut) 
Difference in coefficients (restriction 3) 25.52** 3.05 -14.40* 
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Table 8: The impact of pension reform on CEO pension: 
Comparison between high and low DB pension groups 
This table reports results from Tobit regressions describing the impact of UK pension reforms on CEO pension. 
The dependent variables are CEO total DB pension (LN £000s’) in columns (1) and (2); and DB/ Total pension 
(%) in columns (3) and (4). High DB_AA (LTA) refers to firms whose CEO DB pension exceeds the annual 
allowance (lifetime allowance) prior to 2006. Among our 1,155 observations, 763 observations are left-censored 
while 392 observations are uncensored. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. Z statistics are reported in bracket. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DB pension total (LN £000s) DB/ Total pension (%) 
After Apr06 0.53 0.94 -0.37 3.98 
 (0.65) (1.14) (-0.04) (0.41) 
High DB_AA 12.80***  144.27***  
 (11.94)  (11.90)  
High DB_LTA  12.72***  141.59*** 
  (11.97)  (11.51) 
After Apr06* High DB_AA -3.32***  -50.77***  
 (-2.84)  (-3.83)  
After Apr06* High DB_LTA  -3.84***  -56.74*** 
  (-3.29)  (-4.19) 
CEO age 5.32** -1.31 2.63 -64.58** 
 (2.01) (-0.50) (0.09) (-2.12) 
CEO tenure -0.71* -0.33 -9.10** -5.45 
 (-1.81) (-0.84) (-1.99) (-1.18) 
Foreign CEO -0.06 -0.45 -3.90 -9.10 
 (-0.11) (-0.76) (-0.96) (-1.29) 
Female CEO 0.56 0.76 -11.25 -10.08 
 (0.40) (0.55) (-0.66) (-0.58) 
CEO equity -0.14 -0.06 -1.42 -0.81 
 (-0.84) (-0.38) (-0.75) (-0.42) 
CEO duality 2.41* 2.62* 46.31*** 48.10*** 
 (1.66) (1.83) (2.91) (2.99) 
Board independence -0.13*** -0.14*** -1.39*** -1.54*** 
 (-4.55) (-0.90) (-4.23) (-4.62) 
Firm Size 1.26*** 1.17*** 13.96*** 13.64*** 
 (5.19) (4.85) (5.00) (4.79) 
Market to book ratio 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.48 
 (0.25) (1.10) (0.47) (1.17) 
Leverage 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 
 (2.94) (3.30) (2.58) (2.89) 
ROA 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.39 
 (0.11) (1.02) (-0.01) (0.81) 
Stock return volatility -0.04** -0.04* -0.42* -0.38* 
 (-2.14) (-1.91) (-1.93) (-1.72) 
Constant -30.09*** -4.36 -114.46 144.69 
 (-2.81) (-0.42) (-0.94) (-0.94) 
Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Differenced cross-sectional regressions of CEO pension and firm cash holdings around the UK pension reform 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between changes in CEO DB pension and changes in firm cash holdings (Cash / total assets) around the UK pension reform. t 
statistics are not reported for concision. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Following Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012), we take the average of each variable for each firm before and after the UK pension reform and then use the difference in the 
regression.  
∆Cashi=a0+a1∆Firm Characteristicsi+a2∆DB pensioni+∆εi 
Columns (1) to (3) and columns (7) to (9) are used to test the effect of 2006 reform by using observations from 2003 to 2009 (3 years before and after the 2006 reform). 
Columns (4) to (6) and columns (10) to (12) are used to test the effect of 2011 AA cut by using observations from 2008 to 2014 (3 years before and after the 2011 reform). 
The dependent variable, change in firm cash holdings (cash / total assets), is calculated as the difference between average before the reform (2003–2005 or 2008–2010) and 
average after the reform (2007–2009 or 2012–2014). A firm can only be included if it has at least one observation both before and after the reform.  In columns (1) to (6), the 
sample is 95 unique FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms. In columns (7) to (12), the sample is 86, as we exclude firms with CEO change over the reform period. 
OLS model without firm and year fixed-effect is applied because the sample is not panel data with repeated observations from different periods. 
 Full sample firm if it has at least one observation 
 both before and after the reform 
Sub-sample firm if it has at least one observation both before and 
after the reform; also CEOs do not change during the reform 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 
Change in DB total -0.324   -0.0564   1.337   0.082   
Change in DB to equity ratio  -0.005   0.002   0.020   -0.012  
Change in DB to equity relative   -0.073   0.1638   0.519**   0.262 
Change in firm Size -1.747 -1.991 -2.071 -3.93*** -4.04*** -4.11*** 0.247 -0.130 -0.017 -4.77*** -4.76*** -4.76*** 
Change in market to book ratio -0.238** -0.238** -0.241** 0.154 0.155 0.157 -0.205* -0.225** -0.166 0.154 0.141 0.160 
Change in leverage -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 0.018 0.017 0.019 0.027 0.035 0.073 0.079 0.082 0.084 
Change in operating cash flows 0.135 0.132 0.127 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.200 0.196 0.189 0.234 0.231 0.244 
Constant -0.231 -0.087 -0.039 0.523 0.628 0.702 -1.452* -1.048 -1.028 0.269 0.263 0.278 
             
Firm number 95 95 95 97 97 97 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-Square 0.038 0.029 0.029 0.101 0.101 0.103 0.012 0.007 0.045 0.136 0.137 0.137 
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Table 10: Differenced cross-sectional regressions of CEO pension and firm R&D expenses around the UK pension reform 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between changes in CEO DB pension and changes in firm R&D expenses (R&D / total sales) around the UK pension reform. t 
statistics are not reported for concision. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Following Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012), we take the average of each variable for each firm before and after the UK pension reform and then use the difference in the 
regression.  
∆RDi=a0+a1∆Firm Characteristicsi+a2∆DB pensioni+∆εi 
Columns (1) to (3) and columns (7) to (9) are used to test the effect of 2006 reform by using observations from 2003 to 2009 (3 years before and after the 2006 reform). 
Columns (4) to (6) and columns (10) to (12) are used to test the effect of 2011 AA cut by using observations from 2008 to 2014 (3 years before and after the 2011 reform). 
The dependent variable, change in firm R&D expenses (R&D / total sales), is calculated as the difference between average before the reform (2003–2005 or 2008–2010) and 
average after the reform (2007–2009 or 2012–2014). A firm can only be included if it has at least one observation both before and after the reform.  In columns (1) to (6), the 
sample is 95 unique FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms. In columns (7) to (12), the sample is 86, as we exclude firms with CEO change over the reform period. 
OLS model without firm and year fixed-effect is applied because the sample is not panel data with repeated observations from different periods. 
 Full sample firm if it has at least one observation 
 both before and after the reform 
Sub-sample firm if it has at least one observation both before and 
after the reform; also CEOs do not change during the reform 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 
Change in DB total 0.002   0.010   0.148   -0.047   
Change in DB to equity ratio  -0.001   -0.001   0.001   -0.002  
Change in DB to equity relative   0.032   -0.002   0.017   -0.062 
Change in firm Size -0.425 -0.403 -0.428 -0.78*** -0.75** -0.76*** -0.525 -0.558 -0.557 -1.08*** -1.08*** -1.08*** 
Change in market to book ratio -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.015 -0.016 -0.015 0.030 0.028 0.028 
Change in leverage 0.023 0.023 0.024 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.014 0.014 0.013 
Change in operating cash flows 0.025 0.026 0.024 -0.069** -0.070** -0.069** 0.029 0.029 0.029 -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
Constant -0.137 -0.154 -0.128 0.155 0.126 0.142 -0.112 -0.073 -0.070 0.131 0.120 0.124 
             
Firm number 95 95 95 97 97 97 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-Square -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 0.073 0.074 0.073 -0.032 -0.034 -0.033 0.193 0.194 0.196 
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Table 11: Differenced cross-sectional regressions of CEO pension and firm CAPEX expenses around the UK pension reform 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between changes in CEO DB pension and changes in firm CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / total sales) around the UK pension 
reform. t statistics are not reported for concision. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
Following Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012), we take the average of each variable for each firm before and after the UK pension reform and then use the difference in the 
regression.  
∆CAPEXi=a0+a1∆Firm Characteristicsi+a2∆DB pensioni+∆εi 
Columns (1) to (3) and columns (7) to (9) are used to test the effect of 2006 reform by using observations from 2003 to 2009 (3 years before and after the 2006 reform). 
Columns (4) to (6) and columns (10) to (12) are used to test the effect of 2011 AA cut by using observations from 2008 to 2014 (3 years before and after the 2011 reform). 
The dependent variable, change in firm CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / total sales), is calculated as the difference between average before the reform (2003–2005 or 2008–2010) 
and average after the reform (2007–2009 or 2012–2014). A firm can only be included if it has at least one observation both before and after the reform.  In columns (1) to (6), 
the sample is 95 unique FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms. In columns (7) to (12), the sample is 86, as we exclude firms with CEO change over the reform period. 
OLS model without firm and year fixed-effect is applied because the sample is not panel data with repeated observations from different periods. 
 Full sample firm if it has at least one observation 
 both before and after the reform 
Sub-sample firm if it has at least one observation both before and 
after the reform; also CEOs do not change during the reform 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 
Change in DB total -0.252   -0.006   -0.857   -0.302   
Change in DB to equity ratio  -0.008   -0.005   -0.006   -0.009  
Change in DB to equity relative   -0.197   -0.039   -0.168   -0.088 
Change in firm Size 2.088 1.980 1.859 -0.487 -0.423 -0.471 1.196 1.413 1.379 -1.840 -1.811 -1.830 
Change in market to book ratio -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.27*** 0.107 0.101 0.106 -0.010 -0.001 -0.020 0.052 0.039 0.047 
Change in leverage -0.042 -0.040 -0.050 0.083 0.084 0.083 -0.088* -0.093* -0.105** 0.098 0.098 0.095 
Change in operating cash flows -0.045 -0.042 -0.048 -0.213 -0.216 -0.214 -0.253* -0.251* -0.249* -0.227 -0.230 -0.231 
Constant -0.945 -0.895 -0.841 0.539 0.459 0.519 -0.110 -0.353 -0.361 1.253 1.189 1.205 
             
Firm number 95 95 95 97 97 97 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-Square 0.118 0.113 0.114 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.025 0.018 0.023 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
51 
 
Table 12: Differenced cross-sectional regressions of CEO pension and stock return volatility around the UK pension reform 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between changes in CEO DB pension and changes in stock return volatility (S.D of return) around the UK pension reform. t 
statistics are not reported for concision. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
Following Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu (2012), we take the average of each variable for each firm before and after the UK pension reform and then use the difference in the 
regression.  
∆Stock return volatilityi=a0+a1∆Firm Characteristicsi+a2∆DB pensioni+∆εi 
Columns (1) to (3) and columns (7) to (9) are used to test the effect of 2006 reform by using observations from 2003 to 2009 (3 years before and after the 2006 reform). 
Columns (4) to (6) and columns (10) to (12) are used to test the effect of 2011 AA cut by using observations from 2008 to 2014 (3 years before and after the 2011 reform). 
The dependent variable, change in stock return volatility (S.D of return), is calculated as the difference between average before the reform (2003–2005 or 2008–2010) and 
average after the reform (2007–2009 or 2012–2014). A firm can only be included if it has at least one observation both before and after the reform.  In columns (1) to (6), the 
sample is 95 unique FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms. In columns (7) to (12), the sample is 86, as we exclude firms with CEO change over the reform period. 
OLS model without firm and year fixed-effect is applied because the sample is not panel data with repeated observations from different periods. 
 Full sample firm if it has at least one observation 
 both before and after the reform 
Sub-sample firm if it has at least one observation both before and 
after the reform; also CEOs do not change during the reform 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 2006 reform 2011 AA cut 
Change in DB total 0.624   -0.663   1.334   -0.643   
Change in DB to equity ratio  0.010   0.007   0.135**   -0.037  
Change in DB to equity relative   0.650   -0.166   0.422   -1.664 
Change in firm Size 11.63*** 12.07*** 12.17*** 0.826 -0.148 0.064 12.49*** 11.71*** 12.22*** 7.373* 7.465* 7.318* 
Change in market to book ratio 0.098 0.097 0.120 -0.063 -0.068 -0.082 0.395 0.309 0.424 -0.077 -0.126 -0.116 
Change in leverage 0.202 0.200 0.230 0.323*** 0.311** 0.311** 0.197 0.206 0.235 0.237 0.241 0.206 
Change in operating cash flows -0.041 -0.037 -0.036 -0.223 -0.208 -0.216 0.192 0.175 0.183 -0.227 -0.238 -0.295 
Constant 8.708*** 8.453*** 8.503*** -5.32*** -4.41*** -4.66*** 6.311*** 6.974*** 6.722*** -8.22*** -8.39*** -8.30*** 
             
Firm number 95 95 95 97 97 97 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Adjusted R-Square 0.110 0.105 0.110 0.067 0.044 0.044 0.117 0.173 0.119 0.029 0.030 0.040 
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Table 13: CEO pension and firm cash holdings: Panel regressions  
This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension and firm cash holdings (Cash/total 
assets). The sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from 2003–2016. The total 
number of observation is 1,155 from 126 unique firms. The dependent variable is firms cash holdings (Cash / 
total assets). DB total is the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity ratio is CEO DB 
pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value. DB to equity 
ratio relative is DB to equity ratio, scaled by a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Columns (1) to (3) employ firm 
(number=126) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. Columns (4) to (6) employ CEO (number=254) and 
year (number=14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard errors that adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in bracket. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A: Full sample 
 Firms fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) -0.023   0.125   
 (-0.261)   (0.652)   
DB to equity ratio   0.001   -0.004  
  (0.191)   (-0.618)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.010   0.038 
   (0.109)   (0.368) 
CEO equity -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 0.137 0.133 0.137 
 (-0.382) (-0.367) (-0.371) (0.763) (0.788) (0.763) 
CEO duality 1.790 1.789 1.784 2.400 2.406 2.398 
 (1.458) (1.403) (1.384) (1.151) (1.156) (1.515) 
Board independence 0.065** 0.066*** 0.066** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 (2.575) (2.589) (2.574) (2.865) (2.881) (2.886) 
Firm Size -2.786*** -2.831*** -2.822*** -2.175** -2.192** -2.175*** 
 (-3.245) (-3.437) (-3.568) (-2.134) (-2.175) (-2.164) 
Market to book ratio 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.012 0.013 0.013 
 (0.956) (0.927) (0.920) (0.288) (0.308) (0.312) 
Leverage -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 (-0.978) (-0.980) (-0.916) (0.092) (0.074) (0.114) 
Operating cash flows 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.231*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 
 (6.067) (6.130) (6.072) (3.942) (3.908) (3.893) 
Stock return volatility 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 (1.328) (1.277) (1.317) (0.428) (0.452) (0.403) 
R&D expenses  0.307* 0.307* 0.306* 0.150 0.148 0.151 
 (1.871) (1.872) (1.870) (0.742) (0.734) (0.748) 
CAPEX expense  0.061 0.060 0.060 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (1.502) (1.486) (1.482) (0.291) (0.298) (0.289) 
Dividend payer  -2.722*** -2.741*** -2.739*** -4.114*** -4.139*** -4.129*** 
 (-3.567) (-3.550) (-3.549) (-4.772) (-4.791) (-4.762) 
Constant 27.51*** 27.81*** 27.73*** 18.85** 19.58** 19.23** 
 (3.849) (3.977) (4.121) (2.048) (2.255) (2.227) 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254 
Cross-section F 9.14*** 9.16*** 9.13*** 6.01*** 6.03*** 6.02*** 
       
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.578 0.578 0.578 0.623 0.623 0.622 
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Table 13 (continued) 
Panel B: Subsample 
 
Columns (1) to (3) are for observations with pension deficit (pension assets is lower than pension liability) for a 
given year. Columns (4) to (6) are for observations with pension surplus (pension assets is larger than pension 
liability) for a given year.  
 
 Firms with pension deficit Firms with pension surplus 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) -0.137   0.343   
 (-1.190)   (1.046)   
DB to equity ratio   -0.001   0.011  
  (-0.278)   (0.599)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.029   -0.023 
   (0.254)   (-0.076) 
CEO equity 0.016 0.013 0.016 -1.169 -1.009 -0.864 
 (0.090) (0.074) (0.090) (-1.075) (-0.916) (-0.796) 
CEO duality 0.912 0.757 0.889 -11.16*** -11.16*** -11.41*** 
 (0.726) (0.589) (0.682) (-2.664) (-2.722) (-2.789) 
Board independence 0.056* 0.059** 0.059** -0.066 -0.057 -0.060 
 (1.946) (2.046) (2.038) (-0.358) (-0.287) (-0.287) 
Firm Size -0.507 -0.745 -0.794 -5.245** -5.173** -5.355** 
 (-0.593) (-0.923) (-1.017) (-2.056) (-2.040) (-2.204) 
Market to book ratio -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.006 0.003 
 (-0.022) (-0.116) (-0.093) (0.152) (0.099) (0.056) 
Leverage -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.261** -0.265** -0.262** 
 (-0.079) (-0.045) (0.013) (-2.182) (-2.215) (-2.181) 
Operating cash flows 0.187*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 0.244 0.233 0.218 
 (4.789) (4.840) (4.830) (0.866) (0.835) (0.799) 
Stock return volatility -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 0.082 0.077 0.077 
 (-0.350) (-0.380) (-0.436) (0.918) (0.852) (0.809) 
R&D expenses  -0.099 -0.100 -0.097 -0.876 -1.427 -1.600 
 (-0.647) (-0.682) (-0.656) (-0.477) (-0.791) (-0.859) 
CAPEX expense  -0.064 -0.065 -0.064 0.013 0.011 0.013 
 (-0.810) (-0.818) (-0.811) (0.181) (0.143) (0.171) 
Dividend payer  -2.159*** -2.269*** -2.321*** -0.875 -0.741 -0.648 
 (-2.878) (-3.063) (-3.119) (-0.337) (-0.284) (-0.246) 
Constant 9.313 10.969 27.73*** 69.67*** 68.32** 69.07** 
 (1.275) (1.568) (4.121) (2.891) (2.569) (2.592) 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry No No No No No No 
       
Cross-section number 107 107 107 52 52 52 
Cross-section F 7.99*** 7.95*** 7.94*** 2.45*** 2.42*** 2.41*** 
       
Number of observations 811 811 811 148 148 148 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.537 0.536 0.536 0.479 0.475 0.473 
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Table 14: CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Panel regressions 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension and firm risk-taking proxies. The 
sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from 2003–2016. The total number of 
observation is 1,155 from 126 unique firms. DB total is the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. 
DB to equity ratio is CEO DB pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs 
holding value. DB to equity ratio relative is DB to equity ratio, scaled by a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Columns 
(1) to (3) employ firm (number=126) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. Columns (4) to (6) employ 
CEO (number=254) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard errors that 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in bracket. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable = R&D expenses (R&D / sales)  
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) 0.022***   0.019   
 (2.624)   (0.959)   
DB to equity ratio   -0.001   -0.002*  
  (-0.930)   (-1.797)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.001   -0.023 
   (0.036)   (-0.990) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254 
Cross-section F 107*** 107*** 107*** 53*** 53*** 53*** 
       
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.925 0.925 0.935 0.924 0.924 0.924 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Panel B: Dependent variable = CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / sales)  
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) 0.107***   0.202   
 (2.870)    (1.021)   
DB to equity ratio   0.002   0.001  
  (0.730)   (0.198)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.093**   0.159** 
   (1.974)   (2.551) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254 
Cross-section F 30*** 31*** 31*** 15*** 15*** 15*** 
       
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.781 0.809 0.809 0.775 0.774 0.775 
 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable = Stock return volatility 
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) 0.022   -0.311   
 (0.159)    (-1.111)   
DB to equity ratio   0.015   0.063***  
  (1.519)   (3.683)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.029   0.068 
   (0.186)   (0.509) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 126 126 126 254 254 254 
Cross-section F 7.72*** 8.08*** 8.08*** 6.11*** 6.46*** 6.32*** 
       
Number of observations 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.662 0.663 0.662 0.725 0.729 0.725 
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Table 14 (continued) 
Panel D: Summary of regression results 
This panel summaries regression results in panel A, B and C in Table 14 as well as Panel A in Table 13. “No” 
indicates that the result is not statistically significant for the level of 10%. “Positive” (“Negative”) indicates that 
the result is statistically significant (10%) and the coefficient is positive (negative).  
 
 Expected 
Sign 
DB pension total DB to equity ratio DB to equity ratio 
relative 
  Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Cash holdings (+) No No No No No No 
        
R&D expenses (-) Positive No No Negative No No 
        
CAPEX expenses (-) Positive No No No Positive Positive 
        
Stock return volatility (-) No No No Positive No No 
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Table 15: CEO pension and firm risk-taking: 2SLS regression 
This table reports the 2SLS estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension and risk-taking proxies. The sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility 
firms from 2003–2016. The total number of observation is 1,155 from 126 unique firms. DB total is the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity 
ratio is CEO DB pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value. DB to equity ratio relative is DB to equity ratio, scaled by a 
firm’s debt to equity ratio. Cash2assets is a firm’s cash holdings scaled by its assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s daily return. RD2sales is a firm’s R&D 
spending scaled by its sales. CAPEX2sales is a firm’s CAPEX spending scaled by its sales. Panel A reports the results from first-stage regression, where the dependent 
variables are DB total, DB to equity ratio and DB to equity ratio relative. The instrument variable is the log of CEO age. Panel B reports the second-stage regressions results, 
where DB total, DB to equity ratio and DB to equity ratio relative are using the fitted values from first-stage regression.  P-values are based on robust standard errors that 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A   First-stage results  
 
Variables Dependent variable= 
DB total (LN£000s) 
Dependent variable= 
DB to equity ratio 
Dependent variable= 
DB to equity ratio relative 
Log (CEO age) 1.720* 45.977*** 1.566*** 
Variables from 2-step regression Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observation 1115 1115 1115 
Adjusted R-Square 0.093 0.066 0.062 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test 
   
Null: DB total is exogenous (p value) 0.008***   
Null: DB2equity is exogenous (p value)  0.011**  
Null: DB to equity relative is exogenous (p value)   0.011** 
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Table 15 (continued) 
Panel B   Second-stage results 
Variables Dependent variable = 
Cash2asssets  
Dependent variable = 
Volatility 
Dependent variable = 
RD2sales 
Dependent variable = 
CAPEX2sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DB total (Ln£000s) -5.361   -14.703   -1.284   -1.646   
DB to equity ratio  -0.132**   -0.363**   -0.032**   -0.041  
DB to equity ratio relative   -4.071**   -11.17**   -0.975*   -1.250 
Main controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observation 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 1,155 
             
Weak instrument test: 
Cragg-Donald statistic 
Critical value= 16.38 
(p=0.1) 
 
 
1.016 
 
 
13.786 
 
 
6.467 
 
 
1.016 
 
 
13.786 
 
 
6.467 
 
 
1.016 
 
 
13.786 
 
 
6.467 
 
 
1.016 
 
 
13.786 
 
 
1.016 
 
  
59 
 
Table 16: CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Excluding zero value DB pension 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension and risk-taking proxies. The sample 
contains 392 observations with non-zero DB pension value from UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility 
firms from 2003–2016. The dependent variables are firm cash holding, R&D, CAPEX and stock return volatility 
in Panel A, B, C and D, respectively. The independent variables are DB total, DB to equity ratio and DB to 
equity ratio relative. DB total is the natural logarithm of a CEO’s total DB pension value. DB to equity ratio is 
CEO DB pension total value, scaled by the sum of CEO’s shares, stock options and LTIPs holding value. DB to 
equity ratio relative is DB to equity ratio, scaled by a firm’s debt to equity ratio. Columns (1) to (3) employ firm 
(number=55) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. Columns (4) to (6) employ CEO (number=89) and year 
(number=14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard errors that adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in bracket. All variables are defined 
in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Cash holding (Cash / assets)  
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) -0.123   -1.111   
  (-0.589)    (-1.016)   
DB to equity ratio   0.005   -0.001  
  (0.753)   (-0.043)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.043   0.048 
   (0.251)   (0.260) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89 
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.579 0.580 0.579 0.649 0.646 0.646 
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Table 16 (continued) 
Panel B: Dependent variable = R&D expenses (R&D / sales) 
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) -0.006   0.010   
 (-0.202)    (0.115)   
DB to equity ratio   -0.001   -0.001  
  (-1.304)   (-1.632)  
DB to equity ratio relative   -0.007   -0.020 
   (-0.682)   (-1.175) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89 
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.973 0.973 0.973 
 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable = CAPEX expenses (CAPEX / sales) 
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) 0.019   0.729   
   (0.204)    (1.302)   
DB to equity ratio   -0.004   0.001  
  (-1.631)   (0.462)  
DB to equity ratio relative   -0.073**   0.048 
   (-2.266)   (0.907) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89 
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.851 0.852 0.852 0.862 0.861 0.861 
 
 
 
 
 
61 
 
Table 16 (continued) 
Panel D: Dependent variable = Stock return volatility 
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DB total (Ln£000s) 0.103   -0.040   
   (0.219)    (-0.029)   
DB to equity ratio   0.030**   0.069***  
  (2.049)   (4.223)  
DB to equity ratio relative   0.137   0.121 
   (0.845)   (0.645) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
CEOs No No No Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cross-section number 55 55 55 89 89 89 
Number of observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.710 0.716 0.710 0.733 0.750 0.733 
 
 
Panel E: Summary of regression results 
This panel summaries regression results in panel A, B, C and D. “No” indicates that the result is not statistically 
significant at the level of 10%. “Positive” (“Negative”) indicates that the result is statistically significant (10%) 
and the coefficient is positive (negative).  
 
 Expected 
Sign 
DB pension total DB to equity ratio DB to equity ratio 
relative 
  Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Firm 
fixed-
effect 
CEO 
fixed-
effect 
Cash holdings (+) No No No No No No 
        
R&D expenses (-) No No No No No No 
        
CAPEX expenses (-) No No No No Negative No 
        
Stock return volatility (-) No No Positive Positive No No 
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Table 17: CEO pension and firm risk-taking: Using DB pension dummy 
This table reports the estimation of the relation between CEO DB pension dummy and risk-taking proxies. The 
sample includes UK FTSE 100 non-financial and non-utility firms from 2003–2016. The total number of 
observation is 1,155 from 126 unique firms and 254 unique CEOs. The dependent variables are Cash/assets, 
R&D/sales, CAPEX/sales and Stock return volatility in column (1) & (5), (2) & (6), (3) & (7) and (4) & (8) 
respectively. The independent variable is DB dummy, which equals one if a CEO has DB pension, otherwise 
zero.  Columns (1) – (4) employ firm (number=126) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. Columns (5)–(8) 
employ CEO (number=254) and year (number=14) fixed-effect model. P-values are based on robust standard 
errors that adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm (White cross-section). The asterisks *, **, *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. t statistics are reported in bracket. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 Firm fixed-effect CEO fixed-effect 
Variables Cash / 
assets 
R&D / 
sales 
CAPEX 
/ sales 
Stock 
return 
volatility 
Cash / 
assets 
R&D / 
sales 
CAPEX 
/ sales 
Stock 
return 
volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DB dummy -0.325 0.182** 0.92*** 0.228 -0.739 0.091 3.470* -5.894 
 (-0.492) (2.372) (2.531) (0.175) (-0.369) (0.336) (1.820) (-1.433) 
         
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO equity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Corporate governance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firms Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
CEOs No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Cross-section number 126 126 126 126 254 254 254 254 
No. observations 1,155 1,115 1,155 1,155 1,154 1,154 1,154 1,154 
DB dummy =1 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 
         
Adjusted R-Squared 0.561 0.925 0.781 0.712 0.608 0.924 0.775 0.726 
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Endnotes 
 
                                                          
i Caliskan and Doukas (2015) find that inside debt increases dividend payout due to CEO risk aversion. They 
argue that dividend payout is less risky than capital investment. 
 
ii Kabir et al. (2013) test the relation between CEO pension and bond yield on a small UK sample. While their 
findings support the risk reduction incentives from inside debt, they do not test any firm risk taking policy 
explicitly. Kabir et al. (2018) provide evidence that R&D will decline if retiring CEOs have more inside debts, 
while this is not the case for CEO of other age groups. 
 
iii As Edmans and Liu (2011) suggest, “existing studies are focused on large firms in the U.S. It is not clear 
whether these findings are representative of all firms, or firms overseas.” 
 
iv As Li et al. (2018) state, “Although our analyses are based on US data, we believe that an interesting avenue 
for future research would be to extend our approach to the global debate…” 
 
v The <LCP FTSE 100 executive pension survey 2015> also documents that recently UK CEOs are paid with 
lower level pension in exchange of higher level of cash compensation, namely cash in lieu of pension. 
 
vi See < InterContinental Hotels Group PLC annual report 2014>, page 82. 
 
vii Withdrawing pension gradually over many years will result in significantly less income tax. More details 
about tax on early pension withdrawal is available at: 
 https://www.gov.uk/early-retirement-pension/personal-and-workplace-pensions 
 
viii This is also true in the US. Based on data from Execucomp, there are 11 (out of 1,744) CEOs who withdrew 
the full balance of their inside debt in 2014. 
 
ix See <HSBC Holdings plc 2006 Remuneration Report>, page 286–287. 
 
x OECD (2013) reports that 18 out of 35 OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) countries provide DB pension for all public sector workers, while private (occupational) scheme 
of DB pension is mandatory or quasi-mandatory in three countries: Iceland, the Netherlands and Switzerland. 
 
xi See IRS Technical Guidelines for Employment Tax, available at: 
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-023-005r-cont01.html#d0e1980 
 
xii Special unapproved scheme, such as Employer-Financed-Retirement-Benefit-Scheme (EFRBS) can be setup 
to evade the contribution limit, but the scheme is overwhelmingly complex and quite costly to operate. Its uses 
were not widespread before 2011 AA reduction (Goh & Li, 2015). 
 
xiii See “Tackling disguised remuneration avoidance schemes” technical note at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tackling-disguised-remuneration-avoidance-schemes-overview- 
of-changes-and-technical-note/technical-note 
 
xiv For example, before 2006, tax reliefs on pension contributions are offered on a percentage basis, usually at 15% 
of pensionable income and subject to Earnings Cap (which was later replaced by AA and LTA). Given that 
Earnings Cap in 2005/6 tax year was £105,600, the maximum tax-free contribution a CEO can put into a 
company pension scheme is merely £15,840 (105,600 × 15%) in that year. CEOs can use unfunded unapproved 
retirement benefit scheme (UFRBS) to top up their pension contribution beyond the restriction. Since 2006, 
UFRBS has been renamed to EFRBS. But these additional contributions do not attract any tax relief, e.g., they 
are taxed as normal income. However, unapproved scheme has a critical advantage: at retirement, pension 
benefit can be withdrawn as a lump sum tax-free. 
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xv Before 2006, annual pension benefit was limited by a maximum amount. The maximum pension was usually 
two thirds of a CEOs final salary or Earnings Cap, whichever is lower. For example, the Earnings Cap in 2005–
06 tax year was £105,600, which means the maximum benefits retired CEOs can get from an approved pension 
scheme was £70,400 in that year. However, CEOs can receive additional benefits beyond this limit using 
unapproved schemes. As discussed in the previous footnote, unapproved scheme is very attractive because the 
total benefit can be withdrawn tax-free. It is also a common practice to top up CEOs pension based on this 
method. 
 
xvi The 2009 budget for UK government is available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407203659/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/bud09_completereport_2520.pdf 
The 2010 budget for UK government is available at: 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/budget-june-2010 
 
xvii As stated in Sundaram and Yermack (2007): “It is possible that the large equity awards Welch received in his 
final years in office were partly intended to counteract the incentives for conservative management that would 
otherwise have arisen from his large pension value.” 
 
xviii Liu et al. (2014) also argue that cash balance is a tool to counter weak firm corporate governance. Their 
financial contracting hypothesis also predicts a negative association between inside debt and cash holdings. 
xix Cassell et al. (2012) are aware of this: “we cannot completely eliminate endogeneity as a potential 
confounding factor”. Lacker and Rusticus (2010) also criticise the overwhelming application of instrumental 
variables in empirical studies. They argue, in many cases, estimates from instrumental variables are no better 
than estimates from OLS. 
 
xx Difference-in-difference approach does not apply in our case as the tax reform is universally applied to every 
firm in the UK. For difference-in-difference to work, an independent and random condition needs to apply to a 
subset of firms. For example, Low (2009) uses geographic location (firm located in Delaware) to distinguish 
treatment and control firms. Firms which locate in Delaware are treatment firms; while other firms are control 
ones. We could only use difference-in-difference approach if certain UK firms are subject to the pension reform, 
while other UK firms are not subject to the reform.  
 
xxi This result is comparable to the US CEOs. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) find that the ratio between executive 
pension and total compensation has a median value of 34% in the US. 
 
xxii For example, Michael Bailey of Compass Group plc was replaced by Richard Cousins just before the 2006 
pension reform at the end of financial year 2005. At the time of the CEO change, Michael had DB pension of 
£15 million. After the change, Richard does not have any DB pension. A crude difference between CEO DB 
pension before and after the reform counts this as a change of compensation policy. 
 
xxiii See Section B of <CEOs and CFOs With and Without inside Debt> in van Bekkum (2016) for detailed 
discussion. 
